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AN ESSAY ON RACIAL TENSION

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By

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NOTE

THE study of race relations as a separate subject under that name began at Chatham House in October 1952. The essay that follows was written in August 1953, partly as a stimulus to discussion at the unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference held in March 1954 at Lahore, Pakistan, partly to inform the sister Institutes throughout the Commonwealth of the progress so far made in the study of the subject at Chatham House and the plans envisaged for the future, and partly to clear the writer's mind. It is meant to be provocative but not final; such conclusions as are suggested are entirely tentative. An attempt has been made to avoid assumptions and where moral judgments are made or implied to recognize and state them; ultimately, however, each reader must make his own moral judgment. Some changes have been made since the Conference, mainly to bring the essay up to date, but also to modify the emphasis here and there. There is a synopsis of the argument at the end.

May 1954 P. M.

PREFACE

THERE are few people who can talk about race without displaying feeling, and often violent feeling, one way or another, and to try to write of it dispassionately is to expose oneself to criticism from every angle. And one may as well admit at once that to write adequately of every aspect of race and the passions it arouses would require not only the pen of an angel but some acquaintance with almost every branch of human learning and an intimate knowledge of territories in every quarter of the world. In despair of success in so rash a venture, there are many scholars today who with patient toil are analysing minute portions of the subject, portions small enough for the analysis to be as complete as any merely human mind can make it. Such studies may be thought of as bricks, essential to the building which may one day be made, but sadly in need of an architect.

This essay does not profess to be the plan which one day an architect will draw up. It is a first rough sketch, a series of elevations, from different angles, of one possible building, and by a prentice architect. There will be sculleries and corridors missing and no way, perhaps, into the ballroom. But it is worth making the sketch, because it may induce others to submit designs. Even so, with no claim at all to be final, the attempt demands a word of personal explanation. It is only recently that I have begun the formal study of this subject at the desk. But for many years I lived in an atmosphere of racial and political tension and it is only now, looking back at past

years, that I begin to perceive the anæsthetizing effect such a situation had, an effect to some degree apparent in the case of almost everyone who took part in it from the privileged side.

There was much in that situation of which one was hardly at all conscious, and perhaps for this reason there was nothing more irritating than to read generalizations about India by people who did not know the small fragment of India that was all of which I professed any knowledge. But though it was true that they knew much less than I did of certain aspects of the life of some people in a small area, some of them did perceive—I am now ready to admit—much more than I did about the whole situation of which I formed a part and which I found so difficult to see. So long as he mingles some humility with his temerity, the outsider's view may be constructively revealing. And I should like it to be understood that when I now generalize about other countries which I do not know intimately, I am well aware, not only of the irritation this is bound to cause, but also of the essential falsehood, seen in a different light, of almost every generalization about people. No human being is so small as to be wholly consistent; a generalization about the character of one person will not hold good all the time and still less will this be so of anything so complex as a nation. Still, it is by generalization that human thought proceeds and there is no harm in generalizing even about people so long as you are aware of the dangers.

It happens now to be my task to consider what studies of race can usefully be made and the only sensible way to begin it is by a tentative sketch of the whole subject. In this, the personal note will for most of the time be abandoned; as far as humanly possible, we will try to be detached from the subject, looking down on it as if from an aircraft. Now and then, however, we must come

to earth and remember that it is real human beings with whom we are dealing, not the tiny ants one sees from the air, crawling along the roads between the patches of cultivation. But let us begin with a broad picture, from as remote a height as we can reach.

I

THE NATURE OF RACE

To an observer from another planet it would soon appear—if he had even the least political insight—that the states of the world in which we live today are divided into two pairs of opposed groups. Looking at the first pair of groups, he would perceive that both profess to be acting in the name of democracy but that the one interprets democracy in the terms of those eighteenth-century philosophers whose views on individual liberty are embodied in the American Constitution, while the other has followed the ideals of Hegel and Marx and gives the state a value almost mystical, to which all individual rights are ultimately subordinate. But the Western group of powers, who in their own eyes stand for the freedom of the individual, are embarrassed by what appears to some others a deep inconsistency.

It happens that the very vigour which enabled the older Western states to put into political practice the Hellenic and Christian ideal of individual value also drove them overseas to subdue and rule other people. That is why there is a second grouping, in which the division falls between those powers who possess colonial empires, and therefore rule other peoples, and another party among whose leaders are some who were recently released from such tutelage themselves and who regard any alien rule as fundamentally wrong. In this second grouping, the United States are the somewhat reluctant allies of Britain and France as the leading colonial powers; Russia, claiming that she has granted autonomy to her

own minorities, is enabled to pose as champion of the oppressed.

The situation is indeed extremely complex. The two groupings overlap; the emphasis shifts when the Western powers are thought of as protagonists against Russia and again when they are criticized on the grounds of their colonial or racial policies. There are elements, considerable in France, small in Britain, who forget Russian ruthlessness with regard to the individual and sympathize with Russia's declared ideals. They are ideals with an immediate appeal, particularly to the people who in that second grouping were previously colonial subjects, and they are immensely reinforced by the apparent inconsistency between the philosophy and the practice of the Western group. India, for instance, long tied to Britain, retains, now that she has obtained her divorce, a respect and even an affection that were obliterated by resentment when she was still under coverture and which are in continual danger of being again effaced by this inconsistency; with some difference of emphasis, this is true too of Pakistan. India and Pakistan—though again with some difference of emphasis, Pakistan inclining more to the West—are leaders among the states not committed in the first grouping, as between Russia and the West. They are leaders of that party in the second grouping who protest at colonial rule.

But is it in fact colonial rule and nothing more at which these states are protesting? It may well be that they are thinking of something much wider. Most of them are divided from the Western group by race; their leaders speak sometimes in terms which seem to presage a common front of all non-European peoples against those commonly called white. The United States may be guiltless of colonies but on this wider basis they too are open to criticism; they have on their conscience their

treatment of the Negro minority. There are sharp antagonisms to be resolved on this wider front and to these the Cold War gives an immediate urgency. But it would be a mistake to suppose that it is from the Cold War that they derive all their importance. They would continue to be a matter of deep concern to humanity if the Cold War ended overnight. If they are in fact due to race, it may well be that they would also survive a solution of the colonial question.

Here for a moment let us come to earth and consider what the problem means in human terms to human beings. It is hard now to think back only half a century and to remember how complete at the turn of the century was the supremacy which their restless energy and their technical achievements had given the peoples of Western Europe. Politically they controlled a large part of Asia and the overwhelming majority of the surface of the other continents. But their influence was more widespread even than their political control and their superiority in every sphere seemed to themselves unquestionable. Read, for instance, a contemporary account of Lord Curzon's Durbar in Delhi and your breath today is taken away by the certainty, the assurance that this order of things will last for ever, the unconsciousness that anyone not within the charmed circle of the ruling people may have loyalties and passions of his own. The effect of that unconscious arrogance is still felt, even in Asia; it is felt far more sharply by people of the Negro race. Even in Haiti, which has been an independent Negro republic for a century and a half, it still lingers on. Here a recent traveller saw a play dramatizing Haiti's war of independence against Napoleon, a war characterized by cruelty on both sides, French and Negro, but in which the Negroes displayed a courage, tenacity and skill of which they have good reason to be proud. The

actors representing the French might have been expected to whiten their complexions by some kind of make-up; but no, it was those representing their own ancestors who put soot on their faces, creating, wrote the traveller, a very confusing effect. Even after so many years, the belief that a fair skin is more respectable than a dark was still so strong that the polite pretence must be made that all the actors were fair.

Treaties and political settlements then are not going to be enough to undo the humiliation which some races feel they have endured at the hands of others. It is a matter of deep feeling between groups of people and it becomes necessary to consider what it is that does really bind groups of human beings together and divide them. It is something about which it is not easy to generalize, whether you are thinking of national states or smaller groups. Language may be a bond, but everyone will think at once of the Swiss, a singularly united people and yet divided by more than language; to talk to a French Swiss after a German is to move into another world of values. A tradition long shared may be France's secret but it is hardly Yugoslavia's; religion may divide Holland from Belgium but has not been enough to keep Bavaria apart from Prussia.

A common ancestor is one of the most frequent grounds put forward for regarding the rest of the world as alien but there can be few tribes or peoples for whom this is not to some extent a delusion. Many people who speak German have in the last century come to think of themselves as distinguished from everyone else by their ancestry, but the evidence points to their being a mixed folk, and if one groups them by physical features, at least a third of the population of what was once the Kaiser's empire show the characteristics normally regarded as Slavonic, another third those classed as Alpine and less

than a third look at all like their own mental picture of the Nordic man. Altogether, one of the few generalizations that is safe is that members of a group see themselves as in some way distinguished from the rest of the world but need not define what it is that distinguishes them—nor, if they do define the difference, need their idea be a true one. And again, it has to be remembered that groups are not like pebbles; they are not always mutually exclusive. There are individuals who belong to more groups than one; a man may be a Jew as well as a Freemason, or he may lie between two groups and be half French and half English.

There may be many kinds of group, then, bound by many kinds of tie, of which the group members may or may not give a true account. Race is only one of these ties, or imagined ties. And these ties, like the groups themselves may be of many kinds and may overlap or coincide. You may, if you care for labels, call all of them social and some of them racial or cultural or both. Here too the real reason for tension, attraction or repulsion, may be quite different from what is imagined. Tension may, for example, exist between employers and employed for economic reasons and if the two economic groups are visibly of different races, it may be supposed that the tension is wholly racial. Or even if the economic cause is recognized, race will lend the situation an additional bitterness.

Here again let me illustrate by an example in which there was no bitterness and which may seem trivial. It is not wholly typical of the English in India, but it is typical of a mixed attitude. On the first day I was in India I was told that I should almost at once be going into camp, that the nights would be cool and that my personal servant and groom would need greatcoats. I was advised to buy condemned police greatcoats, which

would cost two rupees—three shillings—each. They would not of course be very good, but they would be ' good enough for an *admi* '. *Admi* means a son of Adam, a person, and in this context an Indian villager or servant. *Munt* means the same and is used in the same way in Rhodesia today. My adviser, a kind-hearted man enough though generally regarded as rather eccentric, might have added, and quite rightly, that an *admi* would be glad to have such a coat. There was no strong feeling here about race and indeed during that same first morning an Indian from an outlying part of the district—not an official—happened to drop in and was asked to stay to lunch and take pot-luck. But this visitor was a man of wealth and education; the casual derogatory phrase about the *admi* betrayed a mind closed more on class lines than on racial. There was however a racial element. In England, my adviser might have given an old suit to the gardener and even have said it was ' Good enough for old Smith ', but he would hardly—in 1928—have said ' Good enough for a working man '. The racial difference helped him to think of a whole group as quite different from himself and slowed up the change in feeling about class which had taken place in England since the century began.

It is forgetting common humanity that is the point. Any kind of tension between groups, any form of mass hatred—of which the most extreme example is war—depends in one degree or another on forgetting the humanity common to the two sides and thinking of people as a class and not as individuals. When there is no marked difference in appearance between the groups it is hard not to make an exception, and hatred is sometimes forgotten and pity displayed, even in war, for the individual found sick or hungry. But uniform distinguishes groups and makes such exceptions rare, and of

all forms of uniform the most pervasive and permanent is skin colour. Race then does undoubtedly make it much easier to apply generalizations of hatred, contempt, or arrogant indifference, if there are in any case other grounds for making them—but is this all ? Or does race actually cause hatred? The first question to be settled is whether the hostilities and tensions which in the world today follow racial lines are in fact caused by race, or whether they merely happen to coincide with racial differences which underline hostilities due to other causes, say the colonial situation or the Marxian class struggle, conflict which would be there in any case. If race is the cause, the tension must survive the colonial question; if race only underlines other tensions, race feeling may disappear with them. And here it is as well to be clear what exactly we are talking about.

This does not mean that the stage has been reached for a final definition, since a final definition of race almost inevitably implies a view as to the character of race which might well form a conclusion to the inquiry. Nor is this the place for a classification of mankind after the manner of Linnaeus. Indeed, attempts at classification have been so diverse that it is most unlikely any will ever be devised that will win general agreement; man has a wider distribution and a greater mobility than any species of animal and his movements have blurred the edges of classifiable strains. But a working definition for the present can be attempted as a hypothesis and it is possibe even at this stage to dismiss dogmatically certain fallacies about race. Then perhaps a brief glance at the world about us may serve to give an indication of the kind of racial problems and hostilities we have in mind and to test the hypothetical definition.

In the first place, we should be clear that we are thinking of race in terms of the broadest division of the human

kind. And we are thinking of characteristics that are heritable and visible, such as the colour of the skin and the formation of the hair. We are not thinking of either linguistic or national divisions; we shall not speak of an Aryan race, although the fact that certain peoples speak a group of languages known as Aryan may be evidence of their past movements. Nor shall we speak of the French and English as races but as nationalities. Nor do we suppose that there is anywhere in the world such a thing as a ' pure ' race.

What indeed a ' pure ' race means is not very clear, but in popular speech what may be meant is a race in which the physical characteristics regarded as typical of that race are found without any mixture of their opposites. But there is no people in Europe who are exclusively long-headed, fair-haired and blue-eyed; there is no area in Europe the size of an English county in which among a population mainly of the classical ' Nordic ' type there will not be found people with fairly round heads and with darker eyes and hair. To a scientist, a ' pure ' race might suggest a strain long isolated, in which the original mixture of strains had become stabilized, the best example being the Australian aborigines; but even here there is evidence of different strains and ' pure ' certainly does not mean unmixed. Indeed there is no evidence for supposing that at any time in the past there were populations of any size that were ' pure ' in the sense of unmixed and from which the present mixed populations have developed by migration and inter-breeding. What seems more likely is that there have been periods of isolation, during which inbreeding would take place and there would be some divergence of racial type to meet the environment, so that a distinguishable strain emerged. But such periods of isolation have usually been inter-

rupted by times of movement when the strains have again become mixed.

None the less, racial differences are facts which do exist. Although the people of Sweden are not exclusively blue-eyed, fair-haired and long-headed, they are on the whole fairer and longer headed than the people of the south of France; although in Eastern Africa it may be difficult to find a people who can be described as purely Hamitic or purely Negroid, there is a general difference between Hamitic and Negroid peoples. Still more obvious of course is the difference between the Negro and the Nordic man.

The ' type ' then, is an abstraction; there is no such physical creature as a typical man. And few individuals of a group will correspond exactly with the mental picture—what sociologists choose to call a stereotype—which they themselves make of their own group. But the type is all the same a useful abstraction so long as it is remembered that it is an abstraction, that there are no hard and fast lines and that there is much overlapping. Remembering this, we may for the moment attempt a definition of a race as a group of human beings distinguished from other groups by several genetical and biological characteristics normally found in association. There must be several characteristics; red hair is hereditary but you cannot put all red-haired people into a group and call it a race. Nor will it do to add blue eyes and a long nose to red hair, because there are just as many redheads with brown eyes and snub noses. But the crinkly hair, dark skin and broad nose of the Negro are usually found in association.

Thinking of race in such terms as this, it is at once apparent that the fact of racial difference does not necessarily mean conflict. There are races distinguishably different in many parts of the world who live peaceably

side by side and have done for centuries; there are racial frontiers where a village manifestly of one race lies next to one manifestly of another in a racial chess-board. Race relations are not always bad and it is race relations, not race, that we are concerned with. Our interest is in social relations in which physical differences are believed to play some part. And here it seems useful to engage in a brief and necessarily very superficial survey of the world today, with the object of considering where racial conflict is most acute, what exactly is the kind of tension we are thinking of.

In this quick survey, we make no assumptions for the moment as to the ' equality ' or otherwise of different races. Such terms as ' equality ' or ' superiority ' are in any case valid only when they are defined more closely. In the first place, one can only contrast averages and it may well be that in a particular form of skill or excellence the best individuals of the race with the poorer average can be trained to do better than most individuals of the race with the better average. And it may appear in the end that, in general and so far as generalization is permissible, the average of one race excels in one form of skill but in another is usually surpassed. It may be that many Negroes run faster or learn languages more quickly than many Europeans but that they do not as a rule take so kindly to mathematics. If such expressions as ' better ' or ' worse ' are used, it is therefore always necessary to ask: ' Better for what ? ' On this point, however, no assumptions are at present made, one way or the other.

II

AREAS OF TENSION

STANDING well back to obliterate detail and looking at the world as a whole, it is apparent that much of the conflict and nearly all the visible racial tension is due to the impulse which from the fifteenth century onwards drove people from the western seaboard of Europe across the sea to new countries. It is not wholly a digression to dwell for a moment on the nature of that impulse. There are people who believe that it was purely economic, that for example the English and Dutch were driven to the East Indies by the search for spices, which, because they had no means of winter feeding, they needed to preserve meat for the winter, that the closing of the land route through Constantinople by the Turks was the precipitating factor, and that this alone explains the phenomenon. There are others who will tell you it was the need for gold.

But there are always two ways of dealing with an inconvenience, of which one is to put up with it. It would hardly be possible to find a group of people anywhere in the world who do not suffer from some inconvenience, some want which if realized would make their lives easier. No improvement, however, can take place until someone is aware of the want, until someone thinks of ways of dealing with it and puts them into practice. And during the brief period of five thousand years in which we have any knowledge of mankind's history, the majority have, on the whole and for most of the time, been content to put up with a want or an inconvenience or to meet it by

some local contrivance. There are other people besides Europeans who would have been more comfortable if they had been able to preserve meat by means of spices, but they did not decide that it was worth going half-way across the world to fetch them. The challenge of the environment means nothing unless there is the will to respond to it. And it may surely be the case that curiosity and the desire for adventure provided the first motive, a daemonic urge which does not seem to have arisen so intensely anywhere else. An economic need may well have decided the adventurer where to go but seldom entirely explains why he went. No doubt at every stage there were many reasons for going overseas; no doubt the desire for wealth was often one motive and a conscious one. At every stage, too, there were men who went for motives partly or entirely disinterested, to spread the Gospel or to educate. At any rate, let us not be so gullible as to suppose that the causes of that first European expansion were anything but complex.

Whatever the reason, men from England, Scotland, France, Spain, and Portugal went to the Americas, while from the Netherlands they went to South Africa, and from Holland, France, Portugal, Scotland, and England they went farther east. They fought each other, in Europe and overseas, and their long wars left each nation with recognized spheres of conquest and influence. The process continued into the nineteenth century, when Africa too was divided between the European powers, and it is this expansion more than anything else which has produced the racial conflict we have in mind. That is mainly because it has brought into contact races more sharply contrasted with each other than usually happens in the case of land migrations.

Feeling between races in North America developed in quite a different way from feeling in Central and South

America. We are at the moment engaged only in the most superficial examination, with the object of illustrating the kind of tensions to be discussed, and need say nothing of the French in Canada and Louisiana. What was important here was the impact of settlers, mainly English, Scots, and Irish, on the American Indian of the temperate northern zones. The American Indian was organized in primitive societies, usually warlike, of nomadic, agricultural and hunting peoples. He resisted the pressure of the new arrivals and in the course of a century and a half of sporadic frontier warfare was greatly reduced in numbers by bullets and disease, but as a people the American Indians of the north were never tamed, and in fact it is argued that they took some cultural revenge on their conquerors. They are now treated by the Governments of Canada and the United States with indulgence and perhaps because of their small numbers there is little tension between them and the bulk of the inhabitants of these states. They are not regarded with aversion; on the contrary, there is a certain romantic attraction about them and it is a matter for pride to have an Indian ancestor.

Having established their footing on the new continent, the white settlers in the north cleared the forest by their own efforts and built up an economy of small self-supporting farms. But farther south, where labour in the fields was less attractive, slaves from West Africa were imported and the plantation system of slavery gradually grew up. Meanwhile the white settlers of North America, both in the north and in the south, objecting to the control of what later generations were to call ' Whitehall ', established their independence, and incidentally by the methods they employed gave Whitehall a respect for the views of white settlers which is still a potent force. Independence did not bring an end to

strife, for by their importation of Negroes—mostly in British ships—the colonists brought on themselves a chastisement the British largely escaped; they created a division within their own ranks not yet ended and also a problem which is still on the conscience of the American people. In the Civil War, the Northern States, liberal, individualist, industrial, and democratic, forced an aristocratic, agricultural, and slave-owning South to abandon the institution of slavery, much as the British metropolitan authorities forced abolition on the colonists of South Africa.

But the problem was not solved. Slavery had put a clear, and in fact legal, line between slave and free which had not at first, but which did now, happen to coincide with the racial line between black and white. When slavery was ended, the white people felt the need of something to take the place of that line, all the more as it did not coincide with the class line. There was white daily paid labour, there were poor whites—' crackers '—who were in direct competition with the ex-slave for work, wages and land. The result in the Southern United States was a system which American writers refer to as ' caste ', governed by rigid conventions and backed ultimately by force, disapproved of, at least in theory, by the majority of the citizens of the United States. It is a system of racial segregation, in schools, public buildings and public transport, which is felt by one race as a humiliation, while at the same time the white man enjoys something very near a monopoly of political power and of the control of justice, together with greater opportunities than the Negro for economic advancement. The system is a device intended to stabilize the racial position, to prevent genetic mixture and preserve the relation of dominance and subservience; it is a device which it will be necessary to compare later with other stabilizing

devices. But it should be said at once that while immediately after the Civil War the Southern States displayed the device in a classical form, the philosophy behind it was in direct contradiction to the expressed political philosophy of the United States. And in this clash of philosophical points of view, the view expressed in the Constitution is winning and year by year the stabilizing device is growing weaker.

Here undoubtedly is still one of the points of racial tension, but nothing we have said so far proves that the problem is exclusively one of race. The people of African race in the United States are all the descendants of slaves and it may be that, because the race division coincides with the former division between slave and free, race has attracted to itself the stigma of slavery. With that point should be noted another. In the total population of the Union, the Negro is in a minority, forming only about 10 per cent. But in the sixteen Southern States he is in a minority of one to three. The dominant white group in the sixteen Southern States, although outnumbering the Negro in their own South, are outnumbered by their fellow-whites in the Northern States, from whom they often regard themselves as a separate people. There are other tensions too in the United States, a growing hostility to Puerto Ricans in New York, prejudices against Jews and Chinese; none have assumed the rigidity which until recently characterized the White-Negro relationship in the South.

In Central and South America, the impact of the Europeans took a different form. In the first place, the Europeans were Spanish or Portuguese and their whole approach to life was different from the Northern, in ways which will later be discussed in more detail. They had also a history of contact with the Moors in which a darker people had not only been politically dominant but had

represented a more developed civilization; the Portuguese had also some acquaintance and possibly, though this is not certain, some genetic mixture in Europe with West African slaves, while there had certainly been Carthaginian contacts and probably still earlier infusions of African blood. Whatever the reasons, both Spanish and Portuguese came to the Americas with an attitude to the people of the country which was socially more tolerant than that of the Northerners but in religion more dogmatic.

For the Spaniards there was another difference, the Aztec and Inca being much further advanced in civilization than the Huron or the Seneca. In Brazil, on the other hand, the Portuguese found a people on the whole culturally less developed than the North American Indian or the West African. In both cases, the Europeans conquered the indigenous people and reduced them to subjection; in Brazil slaves from West Africa, Angola and elsewhere, were introduced, though with results very different from those in Virginia. Slavery in Brazil was ended by the will of an element within the state, by the decree of the Princess Regent in 1888, and although the discontent of the slave-owners helped to procure the downfall of the monarchy, abolition was not forced from outside. Throughout South America there was in a far higher degree a mixture of population, while the child of a European father was regarded as belonging to his father's race and not his mother's. The result is a varied population, ranging from almost pure Spanish in the Argentine to a race in northern Brazil who claim to be thoroughly mixed, Negro, Amerindian and Portuguese, and to have no tendency to discrimination on grounds of colour. That a certain social value does attach to a lighter skin is the case, particularly in the south of Brazil, but it must be relevant to the absence of

tension that no hard and fast line exists and that it is hardly possible to make a numerical comparison between one race and another. In Brazil, as in the United States, almost all persons of African blood are descended from slaves, and what tension there has been seems to come from slavery rather than race. But the fact that the tension is more acute in the United States, where slavery is less recent, seems to argue that slave descent is not the only factor which creates tension there. The point, however, is not conclusive because in Brazil the end of slavery did not come about by war. Or again, it may be that the climate makes for tolerance.

In the islands of the West Indies a series of situations arose which cannot be fairly summarized, because conditions vary very much from one island to another. But in general the proportion of American Indian blood left in the islands was much less than on the mainland of South America and the greater part of the population are descended from slaves. Prejudice about colour varies widely from one island to another; in Jamaica, for example, it is said that as in Brazil there is no positive bar at any stage, but that on the whole people of lighter colour are regarded as higher in the social scale; in Barbados there are much more definite barriers between races. In Trinidad, East Indians form between 30 and 40 per cent of the population and at present rates of progress will soon be in a majority. It is suggestive that in Jamaica slave owners were usually absentees. These differences between islands and between the islands and the mainland present a field of study from which it may well be that a tentative theory of the reasons for racial feeling might emerge.

To the west of the American continent lie a series of islands in which there seems to be a fair degree of tolerance between the different races. There is hardly any

Negro blood in these Pacific islands; the indigenous people in many of them are of Polynesian or allied races whose civilization was arrested at a stage not very dissimilar from those of Mexico and Peru and they seem to be a people with whom Europeans can mingle easily. In many of these islands, the situation is complicated by the presence of Chinese or East Indian elements. Here too there is room for a study of racial feeling, but it does not seem likely to be as fruitful as in the West Indies because of the absence of the Negro, who is felt to present the most marked difference in racial characteristics from the European. If such studies were undertaken, they would have to take into account the fact of isolation; it might be supposed that in a small island community it would not be so easy as in a continent to regard people as a class, a generalized and abstract concept; this effect of isolation may however in practice work in one or the other of two opposed ways. The fact that you know who your neighbour is may persuade you to treat him as a human being but it may also, if you are not going to treat him as a human being, intensify the need to erect stabilizing devices and distinguish sharply between one class and another.

In New Zealand European settlers found people of a Polynesian civilization with whom they fought a number of wars and whom they finally subdued. The inhabitants of the country, like the North American Indians, were reduced in numbers as much by disease as by war and are left in a minority reckoned in 1952 at 6 per cent; this must be presumed to exclude those of mixed blood. Partly because they are in a minority, partly because their wars were fought with chivalry, and partly because they appear to be an amiable and adaptable people, the tension here does not appear to be extreme and is in fact dormant. There are suggestions that it might revive if a

change took place in the economic situation causing rivalry between the two peoples for employment. But New Zealand certainly provides support for the view that race of itself need not produce hostility and does in fact only underline other tensions.

In Australia, an extremely primitive people were found by the white settlers. They were never in large numbers and are now in smaller numbers still; like the American Indians of North America, they are now treated with indulgence by the white Government, who do not regard them as dangerous rivals. But while Australia thus has virtually no internal race problem, she has an external problem, because in order to avoid the race problem within her borders she has excluded coloured immigrants. This causes feeling between Australia on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other, but it is hardly a pure racial tension. It is a tension between nations who belong to different races and it is based on fear of a racial tension. It is thus secondary to the kind of problem we are considering.

Asia, too, was a target for the expansion overseas of north-west Europe. The most substantial landing on the main continent was in the area which is now India and Pakistan; this differed from the incursions of Europeans into Africa, America and Australia in that it was throughout recognized as temporary—temporary in a double sense, because the individuals who went there did not mean to settle permanently and also because the occupying power from a very early stage proclaimed—and sometimes acted upon—a doctrine of trusteeship, which envisaged a date, possibly remote, when the ward would come of age and when the occupying power would go. Here rule was by a very small number of the invading race, mostly of good education and with a settled economic position, so that they were personally not in

rivalry with the interests of the people they ruled and sometimes unsuccessfully took their part when clashes of economic interest arose with the parent country. The only legal distinction between the races in Victorian times was the reservation to Europeans of the right to be tried by a jury of their countrymen, but Europeans in practice enjoyed a monopoly of high office. The whole system may be regarded as a device introduced by a dominant race to stabilize a racial position, and although the stability was never meant to be permanent, some features of the 'caste' system in the Southern States were reproduced. Racial feeling grew stronger during the Victorian period but became less as the avowed policy of relinquishing trusteeship was put into effect; only memories of it now remain.

Apart from the European invasion, the continent of Asia contains three main ways of life with many offshoots or branches. Of these, Islam is not only a religious creed, but a system of life affecting dress, food, architecture, literature, social customs and indeed every department of life. It is essentially theocratic but Islamic rulers have shown marked tolerance not only for people who differ from themselves in physical type but also for people who profess other creeds. The Chinese in the past were contemptuous of other cultures and were at first disgusted by the appearance of Europeans, but have shown no marked intolerance of other Asians whose physical type differs from their own; they are a people whose leaders have increasingly accepted Western standards of value and who are now committed to the Russian group of powers. The Hindu way of life is remarkable for a device which must have existed at a very early period and which was used to stabilize a distinction of class which may to some extent have arisen from the racial problem with which the Aryan-speaking

peoples found themselves confronted when they first entered India.

Hindu society was until recently organized in a series of tiers or castes from which there was no escape in the current incarnation and between whom there could be no intermarriage; this had the effect of fixing at the stage it had reached the beginning of a fusion between the lighter-skinned invaders of India and the darker-skinned aboriginals and spread in complicated ramifications to the whole social system, dividing occupations from each other as well as tribes and classes. The device produced social stability long before the arrival of either Muslims or Europeans, though it was periodically overlaid by a high degree of political anarchy. It may well be that it was the extremely static, and indeed passive, character given to society by this device which made successive invasions possible. British rule, by the census and the whole machinery of administration, crystallized caste but also provided a fund of ideas ultimately disruptive, and the leaders of Hindu society came to accept many Western standards of value, in particular the idea of some attempt at providing equal opportunity in the current incarnation. Left to herself, India has introduced a Constitution which is liberal, secular, and democratic and which thus repudiates the ancient device characteristic of Hindu civilization. The hope of improved status in another life had no doubt been one reason why the caste system lasted so long; it is not of course ended by a Constitution and within India some tension between castes survives. But it is due less to the racial strife of four thousand years ago than to the system which was meant to solve it. There are still marked differences in the proportions in which blood groups are inherited by different Indian castes, but there can be little doubt that in spite of the rigidity of the system there has been some

breeding between the castes and it would be difficult now to regard feeling between castes in India as a true case of racial tension. It is rather the aftermath of a stabilizing device which was partly racial in origin.

Externally, however, India has a racial problem the reverse of Australia's; she has a population for whom she cannot at present grow the food and Indians have overflowed on to all the shores of the Indian Ocean. They have not gone as the Europeans went, in the guise of conquerors, but as labourers or small shopkeepers; how they are treated in these capacities is one of the racial problems in a number of other territories. There remains in India a marked hostility to the idea of the domination of one people by another and particularly to the idea of domination by Europeans; this however may be regarded as a product at least as much of nationalism as of race.

The tension between India and Pakistan again is hardly racial. Muslim invaders at various periods converted some Hindus and married others; the element of Persian or Afghan ancestry grows gradually less as one moves eastward and southward from the North-Western passes. Muslim and Hindu must have many ancestors in common but are sundered not only by religion but by diet, philosophy, dress, and by the classical languages from which they draw nourishment, yet under Mogul and under British rule there were long periods when they lived peacefully side by side. In many areas a Muslim village would exist with Hindu villages as neighbours, or there would be a Muslim quarter in a large Hindu village. Here were separate religious and cultural groups within one state. But as the transfer of power came to be thought of as something that was actually going to happen, each group began to fear domination by the other and tension grew. It was a tension between groups based on fear but no one has suggested that race has had

much to do with it. Partition made two states of one but the groups could not be divided into neat territorial areas and partition no more ended tension here than it did in Ulster.

Indonesia was an area in which European domination survived until the second world war; it has ended now and as in India a good deal of bitterness remains at the idea of foreign domination. But it is a sharper bitterness because the departure of the Dutch was not the fulfilment of a long intention, and resentment at old domination has taken a racial colour and is widely applied to European and Americans of the white race.

In Malaya there is a sharp area of conflict but once more it is not clear that it is mainly racial. Britain remains as the colonial power and there is here the familiar impatience of continued colonial status. There is also a clash between the interests of Malays, Indians and Chinese which is clearly cultural and economic but to which not much consciousness of physical difference is attached. In Indo-China too there is colonial strife and also a conflict between groups affiliated to the two European sets of beliefs. But it would be hard to ascribe the conflict with any certainty to physical differences.

In Ceylon a variety of peoples and religions—but peoples not widely separate in physical type—have settled down under the parliamentary form of liberal democratic self-government with every appearance of success.

Russia's expansion into Asia was different from that of England, France, Holland and Portugal for the obvious reason that it proceeded by land not water. There were no intervening land masses or oceans; the racial contrasts encountered were therefore much less extreme; mixture had occurred even before the great political expansion of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth

centuries and in any case there is less visible difference between a Kalmuck, a Mongol, or a Baluch and a Great Russian than between an Englishman and a Negro. As in Spain, there was a history of domination by aliens, in this case Mongols, and there must have been some Mongolian blood left behind. These may be the reasons why there are few indications from Russia of social exclusiveness based on race. But there has of course been a Great Russian expansion which in any other people would be described as imperialism. Under the Tsars, it was a deliberate policy to submerge the smaller nationalities beneath a blanket of the Russian language and culture. The Bolsheviks came into power heavily committed to a different policy and by 1922 they were able to claim that national autonomy was completed and that within the territories of the U.S.S.R. there was complete equality between people of all races; indeed the word race was not even to be mentioned. What had certainly been granted was ' cultural and linguistic autonomy '—that is permission to use the local language—accompanied by a great increase of government expenditure on education and health and in many cases by industrial development.

Everyone is aware of the discrepancy between American ideals and American practice in the matter of the Negro, while Russian claims to have ended racial discrimination have a potent appeal to peoples who are aware of discrimination against themselves. But Soviet practice too falls short of profession. In the first place, it is hard to believe that the recognition of small groups always proceeds entirely from liberal motives; it accentuates differences and discourages larger groupings which might prove more dangerous. And the degree of recognition granted has never gone so far as to permit any display of nationalism or separate loyalty. Up till the death of Stalin the tendency was to withdraw liberties;

even the Webbs, visitors favourably inclined in every way, noted so long ago as 1932 an increasing centralization of authority and more recently the trend has been towards levelling out cultural differences. The alphabetic revolution which ended the use of scripts associated with Buddhism and Islam is a case in point and by 1950 there was a higher proportion of Great Russians in most of the smaller Republics than in 1940. But the intention is now perhaps less to make good Russians than to make good Communists of the minorities.

One example of how national autonomy has worked will however reveal more than generalizations. The Bashkirs are a Muslim people who in 1917 were still semi-nomadic; at the outbreak of the Revolution, their main political sentiment was one of resentment against the Great Russian peasants who were ploughing parts of their traditional grazing grounds and their main political object was to expropriate these and other non-Muslim cultivators. Being disillusioned of their first idea that this was precisely what the Bolshevik Revolution would permit them to achieve, the Bashkirs raised an army and joined the white or anti-revolutionary forces. But finding no more sympathy with their aims in this camp, they entered into negotiations with the Reds and eventually came over *en masse* on the understanding that they would be granted autonomy. The promise was formally honoured and the Bolsheviks sanctioned the formation of a Bashkir Revolutionary Committee. But as soon as this Committee began to draw up measures for the expropriation of Russian peasants, the Soviet institutions in the Ural areas objected. This was not surprising, for the party's strength lay in the soldiers of the Red Army, peasants, and industrial workers and hardly any Bashkirs fell into these classes. It was thus easy for Russians—who did—to obtain mastery of the party organization and

very soon the Regional Committee of the Party, ' heavily dominated by Russians ', secured control of the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee, whose leaders ' with bitterness saw a group of foreign Russians and Tartars transform themselves from a minority into a ruling power by means of the Communist Party dictatorship, and use their position to further the interests of Russian colonists '. In May 1920, little more than a year after the agreement, the central government published a new decree of Bashkir autonomy, which reduced the independence of the Bashkirs to such an extent that their leaders, having passed a resolution condemning in strong terms ' Russian imperialism ' and ' Russian chauvinism ', went into voluntary exile in Turkestan. A fierce rebellion broke out and was sternly repressed; a new Bashkir Republic was formed with a governing committee which did not include a single Bashkir.

The Bashkirs cannot have been an easy people to deal with; it is not easy to fit nomads into a modern state and their demands for land sound impossible. But difficulties are not ended by simply denying that they exist. The truth in Russian claims is that there is probably no social exclusiveness on racial grounds of the kind that exists in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, or Kenya. Nor of course are there found such extremes of racial type. The central government has dispersed education and industrial development; it has permitted the use of local languages. But there is no toleration of differences in religion and politics and thus nothing that the rest of the world would regard as freedom. It is not much use being allowed to use your own language if in any case you dare not say anything worth saying. But though many Soviet nationalities would probably welcome greater freedom, it would be untrue to represent such repressed tensions as racial rather than political.

The general picture of Asia then is of a continent with acute problems of population and food production, a continent suffering from convulsive social changes, as civilizations which have made no progress of their own for many centuries restore their circulation and return painfully to life, but a continent on the whole tolerant of racial as opposed to cultural differences. There is social tolerance in Asia even where there is bitter political feeling, and, with the doubtful exception of Malaya, there seems to be no point within the continent where conflict is primarily on account of race. But externally Asia hangs in the balance. It is to be seen whether the anxiety of new nations to show their manhood will combine with resentment at their former subordination in an increasing bitterness, or whether the sense of old injury will gradually heal. This largely depends on how the Western powers handle Africa.

Europe certainly contains conflicts enough but all races in Europe are so mixed, and it is so seldom possible to say at a glance to what race a person belongs that one is forced to conclude that, with two provisos, there are no antagonisms which are primarily racial. They are rather national, cultural, religious, or linguistic. The provisos relate to feeling about the Jews and about coloured people in Britain.

The Jews are a religious and cultural group, described by scientists as being racially of mixed Mediterranean stock; it is less often than people suppose that they can in fact be distinguished from the surrounding population by any visible signs, and when the visible signs are not imagined by the observer they are not always of a nature which can be measured by scientists. Altogether, there are some grounds for classing as a racial myth the idea that the Jewish problems are racial; the incidence of blood groups does reveal a people hereditarily distin-

guishable and they do usually feel themselves to be a separate group but the feeling does not always persist and they then fuse easily with the surrounding population. Once they themselves forget that they were Jews, the fact can easily be forgotten by others. Their relations with the other people of the states within which for historical reasons they find themselves are often subtle, complex, and intensely interesting but they are not the kind of relationships with which we are for the moment concerned.

The problem of Negroes in Britain has so far been a small one, but it is growing. There is in Britain no legal or social device for the segregation of races, but they are clearly distinguishable and there is a consciousness of difference, with some discrimination which produces for the Negro difficulties in obtaining employment and lodging and a feeling of humiliation as profound as any legal device could do. And because it is unexpected this sometimes embitters the Negro visiting England more sharply than if it were overt. Where there is economic competition, there have been sharp outbreaks of feeling. Here is a growing problem to be taken into account.

But it is in Africa that the main field of race conflict lies. With two exceptions the southern part of this continent has come under European domination, and although the continent must be regarded as a whole and there is much similarity between the problems presented in different areas, the conflict takes differing forms in accordance with the attitude of the European power responsible. In the large area controlled by the French, the controlling nation has shown considerable, though not entire, social tolerance and has recently extended very considerably the privilege of representation in the French Metropolitan Chamber. A distinction must however be made between the Mediterranean littoral, where there

are white settlers, and the southern territories. In the former, the native inhabitants are at a much more advanced stage of the journey to an unrestricted society and the white settlers are outnumbered; there is pressure for the local devolution of power and considerable tension. In the southern territories, the experiment recently made appears for the moment to have eased tensions. But a time will surely come when the African will claim representation according to strict numerical proportions and then—in the absence of a two-party system throughout the French Union—there is likely to be conflict of the sharpest kind.

In the Belgian possessions, the policy has been deliberately adopted of providing adequate economic gains for all Africans who are not in the traditional tribal system and of ensuring that all such Africans shall be in employment, but at the same time of discouraging political discussion, political responsibility, and higher education. There is little social mixing, while education up to matriculation is strictly related to the possibilities of employment and much emphasis is laid on manual skills and preparation for skilled manual work. Control is centralized in Belgium and no devolution of power to Africa is contemplated; those who are sufficiently *évolué* are in theory admitted to all Belgian privileges, but these do not in any case include a vote. It is a strength of the system that the centralization of authority applies to Belgian and African alike. The system is avowedly paternal but no provision is made for the child reaching adult life.

In the Portuguese territories an attitude of some similarity is adopted; there is a sharp distinction between the tribal African and those who have made some approach to the assimilation of the Christian religion and European ways of life. The *asimilado*—of whom there are few—

is at least in theory a full Portuguese citizen with all the rights and privileges of a Portuguese. The tribal African on the other hand is treated with a rigour that is said to be stricter than that applied by any other dominant power and it does not appear to be the intention to take any active steps to encourage him to develop. But here too centralized authority is applied without discrimination to Portuguese and African alike; there are no social humiliations for the educated African and the statistics of crime reveal far fewer offences against the law than in British territory.

There remain the British approach and the South African. The British have evolved a system which until the last few years appeared to be successful in dealing with primitive tribes; it consists of governing them through their own institutions, keeping the peace and preventing only the most obnoxious practices. With this has gone a somewhat haphazard system of primary and secondary education, some higher education for selected leaders, the progressive development of political institutions and some encouragement of political discussion, together with an avowed theory of trusteeship which contemplates an end to foreign tutelage one day.

In those territories where there are no white settlers this policy is successful until the familiar colonial conflict becomes apparent, the government proposing that power should be devolved gradually as experience is acquired, the colonial people becoming almost daily more impatient to achieve power at once. A feature of this stage which seems endemic is distrust by one element of the population of another element, usually more advanced in Western skills, who will, it is feared, monopolize and misuse the power devolved. It is only by an unusual effort of will that the colonial power can avoid regarding this mistrust as a reason for prolonging tutelage and thus

earning the reproach of fomenting it deliberately which will inevitably be addressed to her by the more advanced element in the colonial people. This situation, familiar in Nigeria and the Sudan, once familiar in India and Pakistan, has a converse form, when the more advanced element form a minority who are afraid that they will be swamped by the voting power of the majority.

Different ways of dealing with one form or the other of this crux have been tried in Canada, Ireland, and South Africa; in Kenya and Central Africa, where there are white settlers, the attitude of the metropolitan power is modified by memories of the mistakes made in America in the eighteenth century and of the successful devolution of power in Canada and Australia during the nineteenth century. But the prospect of power being handed to white settlers in these territories is regarded with deep suspicion by Africans; the gap between African and European is too wide to be easily bridged. Neither knows the other's mind and the interests of the two are felt to be in competition, as indeed is clearly the case where there is European daily-paid labour. It is therefore to the African a betrayal to substitute his competitor for the often unpractical but at least disinterested guardianship of Whitehall. Growing tension is thus apparent here.

In the British territories in general, the African has been treated with growing political toleration, but socially has been ignored or kept at a distance and, where there is European daily paid labour, limited by artificial barriers from certain forms of skill and employment. But in South Africa a different situation has arisen. Here five peoples may be distinguished, the dominant European minority divided between Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking, and the non-European majority divided between Africans, Cape Coloureds, and Indians. Here African political rights have not, as in the rest of

Africa, increased of recent years but have in fact been progressively reduced; here the doctrine has been proclaimed that Europeans and Africans cannot live side by side and that the law should recognize and indeed enforce separation, social and political and economic, as complete as can in practice be obtained. At present, the African is paid less than a European even for professional work in which his qualifications are the same; the great majority of Africans are in the lowest income group. All this is to be changed one day by the creation of Native states in which Africans will have full opportunities; a plan is being considered for total segregation which is the most ambitious stabilizing device yet suggested by men. It can only be accomplished by great self-sacrifice on the part of white South Africans, who argue that it is the only course fair to the Bantu and to themselves. It is admitted by its originators to be based on racial tension, which has been made sharper by the feeling between Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking; the Afrikaans-speaking majority, conscious that they belong to a smaller nation, resentful of the English connexion with another and larger nation across the seas, resentful also of past injuries, have perhaps transferred some unexpressed aggressiveness against the English to the non-European and voteless majority.

Here in short the situation is in many respects similar to that in the Southern States of the United States, the Anglo-Boer War taking the place of the Civil War. There is however the difference in the numerical position, already mentioned; the white Southerner is in a majority when the sixteen Southern States are regarded as a separate region, but in a minority in the nation, the United States as a whole. At the same time, the device for stabilizing the race position favoured by the whites of the South is contrary to the constitution of the nation.

In South Africa, on the other hand, there is no substantial divergence of opinion within the Union; the expressed will of the majority of the voters is in favour of the continuation of white domination and the part of the critical Northern States is played by the United Nations and by liberal visitors from the democratic countries.

The main purpose of this brief preliminary survey has been served if it is clear that the kind of tension we are examining is at its most acute where there is a clear-cut racial line within a state and in particular between the African and the Northern European. High in the order of such tensions must be placed South Africa, the Southern States of the United States, the Rhodesias and Kenya. In Great Britain there is a problem in embryo, but it is not yet clear whether the tension will increase or diminish with the growing number of Negroes. Elsewhere, the tensions of which we have taken notice may happen to occur between different races, but usually seem to arise mainly because a change in the social structure, or the possibility of shifting political power, has raised antagonisms and uncertainties between peoples who previously lived peacefully side by side. Such tensions as this cannot be due to inherent racial incompatibility. The relinquishing of control by an imperial power produces such an uncertainty and minorities—whether they are racial or cultural—will then struggle against each other in order to secure a favourable position and to avoid dominance by each other. It may even be that the tension between Africans and North-West Europeans will prove in the end to be merely a form of this same phenomenon, since it may be that it has arisen only because of changes in the world elsewhere and of such changes in Africa itself as the devolution of power to Nigeria and the Gold Coast.

Fear of change seems always to be at least one factor

in racial tension. It seems that wherever two races have come into close contact and one has been able by reason of a greater energy or technical development to master the other, either the two have merged imperceptibly or a stabilizing device has been introduced to prevent change. Such stabilizing devices are introduced by the dominant of the two races and have the double object of maintaining the relation of dominance and keeping their own strain pure from any mixture of the other. Such have been the caste system in India, and its successor, rule by alien officials chosen from the ruling country and due to return there, holding no property in the country ruled; the so-called caste system in the Southern United States; the system of white domination and *apartheid* in South Africa and manifestations elsewhere in Africa. In the ancient world the supreme example, of course, is Sparta.

Here the inquiry seems to split and there are two lines to follow. First we have to consider the circumstances in which stabilizing devices are imposed. They arise in some places and not in others; what factors are present in one case and absent in the other? This can only be answered by returning to the first quick survey and analysing its results, a process which can be carried out without disturbing our provisional refusal to make any assumptions as to the equality of races or the reverse.

The second line of inquiry is more complex. Since a stabilizing device introduced by a dominant race necessarily proceeds on the assumption that its racial stock must not be contaminated by any genetic mixture with the race dominated, the latter are likely to find the device humiliating as soon as they become aware that it is not a law of nature. This is a point Plato perceived when he suggested that the people of his ideal republic should be persuaded that there was gold in the composition of

the ruling caste and base metal in their own, a point of which the early Brahmins were equally aware. The question then arises of whether we ought not to reconsider the assumptions we refused to make. It may be that those who have introduced these stabilizing devices are right and that there is a fundamental inequality between races which—it might be argued—would justify keeping them apart at all costs. An Athenian might, for instance, have argued that the device of slavery, though humiliating to the slaves, was justifiable because it enabled their masters to live a life that was virtuous and artistically creative. Aristotle indeed believed that some people were slaves by nature, permanently inferior. Put into modern terms, this means that stabilizing devices are justifiable in spite of the humiliation they inflict, if it can be shown that the general level of intelligence, the powers of concentration, the creative force, of one race are so far below those of the other that the one is better employed in serving the higher race and releasing its members from mechanical tasks. Of course, such a view might also be hotly contested even if inferiority of this kind were proved, but the point cannot even arise unless there is inferiority. Or again, stabilizing devices might be justifiable if there was any reason to suppose that the offspring of a mixed marriage would be biologically or psychologically inferior to the product of parents of the same race, or again if it could be shown that a race and its culture are inseparably linked, that nothing good comes of a mixed cosmopolitan culture and that a truly creative life and one of a true spiritual integrity is only likely to appear in small and homogeneous units. These possibilities will have to be considered in turn. And it may also be necessary to consider the cost to the dominating race at which stabilizing devices are imposed and whether it is worth paying.

It will be observed that throughout this second line of inquiry it is necessary to make judgments of a moral order and the moral assumptions on which the judgments are based will have to be recognized and stated. This is not to imply that any inquiry can be conducted without moral assumptions of some kind; even the haematologist counting red blood corpuscles proceeds on the Hippocratic assumption that every possible life must be saved; even the economist computing a wage level makes assumptions as to the kind of life his wage-earners ought to live. But in this racial field the moral judgments are often not stated and they are often conflicting.

III

FACTORS WHICH ACCOMPANY TENSION

Let us begin then by considering the circumstances in which stabilizing devices are introduced in some territories rather than others. There are three main factors which may influence the result. These are the type and climate of the territory, the degree of civilization of the race dominated, and the approach of the dominant race.

To begin with the type of territory, there are here two distinctions which to some extent overlap. There is first of all the distinction made by American writers between farm colonies and colonies of exploitation. This is primarily economic; they are thinking of New England as the typical farm colony, where the individual European settler lives on a small farm which he runs with the help of his own family and not much else. By colonies of exploitation they mean countries such as Jamaica, South Carolina and Central America where the colonizers find it necessary to employ non-white labour. The distinction is to some extent a historical one and with increased mechanization in agriculture is changing, but it still exists. It overlaps with the second distinction, which is purely one of climate, between territories where Europeans choose to live and territories where they regard the climate as so intolerable that they usually retire somewhere else in old age. This distinguishes Nigeria and Malaya, where Europeans do not settle permanently, not only from New England but also from Kenya or Peru, in both of which countries Europeans have chosen to settle although they rely largely on coloured labour. Another and very important complication is the presence

in some of these countries of members of the dominant race as competitors in the labour market. But while in all territories where there is white daily-paid labour Europeans settle permanently, there are countries such as Kenya where Europeans do settle permanently but there is little if any white daily-paid labour.

There is obviously a difference where the race subsequently to become dominant finds on its arrival in the new country a civilization already in being. Hawkins, the first servant of the East India Company in India, landed with the comment that: 'They welcomed me kindly after their barbarous fashion' and at the Court of the Great Mogul he preserved always a mixture of external scorn coupled with a good deal of wonder and awe at the luxury he observed. The same mixture is to be seen in the impressions of Cortez and Pisarro. But there was nothing of the kind in the relations, if they can be called relations at all, of the English settlers in New England with the Redskins, of the Dutch at the Cape with the Bushmen and Hottentots or of the Portuguese in Brazil with their naked Indians. In these cases, the solution to the race problem was either subjection or extermination.

We are thinking of problems in the world today and may for the moment disregard such dominations as the Tartar domination of China, the Mogul of India, and the Turkish of the Balkans. We are really concerned with European domination. And in this there is in the first place a broad distinction between the impact on coloured races of Southern Europeans and Northern Europeans; the latter again may be subdivided between those who profess a liberal democratic doctrine and those who do not.

The Mediterranean approach to coloured people differs, of course, between the different nations, the Portuguese

being the most extreme example at one end of the scale, while the French and still more the Belgians are in some respects nearer to the Northern Europeans. There are curious contradictions however within the Mediterranean approach, even among the Portuguese, who lay claim to be not only the oldest but also the most successful colonial nation. There are two elements in their attitude: in the first place there is a readiness to take humanity as it is found, to look at a man as a fellow human being and as an individual. With this goes a characteristic attitude to sex, or perhaps—from the Northerner's point of view—an absence of attitude to sex. The facts of life are there and must be accepted. If a man finds himself in a strange country he naturally takes to him the women of the country; so far from being ashamed of this, he is proud of his procreative powers and acknowledges his children. He thus becomes very quickly aware of the life of the country around him and though he and his descendants may retain a pride in their racial origin and their European connexion, they also acquire a pride in their new country.

But with this tolerant and matter-of-fact attitude goes also a strong proselytizing spirit. Once the Spanish and the Portuguese had decided that the Indians had souls to be saved—about which there was at first a good deal of discussion—they insisted on saving them, or killing them if they refused to be saved. This aspect of the Spanish and Portuguese tradition was dogmatic and ruthless and in Portuguese possessions today it is still ruthless. The colonial people must accept Portuguese culture, language and religion if they are to make any progress. And in a way this is true also of the French. The French language and the French culture must be taken with docility; no good Frenchman believes there is anything better.

Thus the Iberian and to a lesser extent the other Mediterranean peoples have adopted the solution of

fusing with the conquered races, so that there is a gamut of racial colour and a progressive scale instead of a clear-cut line. And they have not introduced stabilizing devices.

The approach of the Northerner to the native races in the countries he discovered really arose from his attitude to life, which was both less matter-of-fact and less dogmatic than that of the Mediterranean peoples. The difference may lie very deep in the ancestral traditions, in memories of long winter nights when the smallest of family groups huddled round the crofter's fire and thoughts and stories turned inwards; for the Mediterranean man, the characteristic scene is the sharp sunlight, the stir and discussion of the market-place in a small town. Whatever the reason, the Northerner has been more divided within himself, more introspective, less ready to be sure about his religion and much less ready to be sure that he approves of the facts of life. He has usually adopted a religion which places a heavy burden on the individual conscience and provides no easy way of unloading a feeling of guilt. Where he has been sure of his religion, he has tended to suppose that salvation is predestined, a view which does not encourage zeal to proselytize. Accordingly on arrival in a new country, the North European was less anxious than the Mediterranean to spread his form of religion or culture and at the same time he was less ready to acknowledge even his own male susceptibility to biological impulse, while in no circumstances must the possibility even be mentioned of sexual relations between a white woman and a black man.

There is an ancient prejudice, widespread at least among Europeans and Indians, which regards with some tolerance the idea of a man mating with a woman of a lower social or tribal category, but looks with sharp dis-

approval on the reverse situation. This may proceed partly from the fact that in the sex relationship the male is dominant and it is felt to be improper that a female of the dominant race should be dominated; it may proceed from a profound male doubt as to the fact of paternity. In either case, it involves a possessive jealousy of which the strength seems to vary in inverse ratio to a man's consciousness of his own motives. In the southern part of the United States, therefore, it became a convention that the white man might keep a Negro mistress or have sexual relations with his Negro slaves, but the fact must not be mentioned, and the children must belong to the woman and to her race. In no circumstances must such a union be legalized. And in Southern Africa the convention is similar, though distinguishable. It is with the shamefaced and furtive male attitude to sex which does not acknowledge paternity and with a fear of the dominant female being dominated more than with any other cause that the worst bitterness is associated.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between the Anglo-Saxon attitude and the German or the Dutch. The English during the time when they were losing their first and winning their second colonial empire were slowly working out a way of managing their affairs which, without stating dogmatically that men were equal, tended more and more to shape institutions on the assumption that they ought to be given a more or less equal chance. In America the seceding colonies were led, in justification of their secession, to embody in a dogmatic form the views which French theorists had detected in English institutions. To a citizen of the United States the Declaration of Rights provides basic assumptions to which he would declare unhesitating, if also usually uncritical, allegiance.

The English and Americans are therefore in the

awkward position that they would affirm in general terms the doctrine that every man should have an equal chance while in practice they are not always prepared to give an equal chance to a man of the dark races. They resemble each other in an ability to acknowledge a faith without allowing it too much influence over their works. The Germans and Dutch, however, have generally been unhindered by any such doctrinal commitments and are inclined to regard the Anglo-Saxon as hypocritical.

Considering these distinctions, it will be seen that in the farm type of colony, such as New England, the problem hardly arises because there is no native labour. The original inhabitants, who were primitive, have been killed or driven away and no coloured labour is required. Race relations are, however, likely eventually to become strained in the colonies of exploitation; while as between the tropical and temperate countries the situation is likely to be worse in temperate countries where Europeans settle, and particularly so where there is white daily paid labour and economic competition. In the purely tropical country, the European has a less permanent stake and can afford to take the whole question more lightly; his women are less likely to be there, and while their absence makes him less exclusive, their attitude, when they are present, is usually more intolerant than his. Again, relations will probably be worse where the dominant race is Northern and not liberal than where it is Northern and liberal, and in both these cases it is likely to be worse than where the dominant race is Mediterranean. It must be added that where the dominant race is liberal, conflict may not be hidden and may appear to be worse than where expression of opinion is suppressed. It is not however so easy to answer the question of whether relations are likely to be worse when the dominated race is civilized or when it is primitive.

Today most people would say that it is with the Negro that the question is really acute, but a different answer would have been given forty or fifty years ago. Then it would have seemed that relations were worse in Asia than with the Negro; outside America the Negro was hardly conscious that he had any rights. This is because in the relation of dominant and dominated people there tends in the modern world to be a typical cycle.

Whether people are civilized or primitive, for the great majority of mankind, and for most of history, society has been based on status; the individual's place in society is usually assumed at birth, and though it may develop as he grows older, it is unlikely to change relatively to others of his own age. Of course, there may be exceptions; Haroun ar-Rashid may turn a beggar into a Vizier, but on the whole peasant stays peasant and noble stays noble. This was the condition of English society until the Tudor reigns, of French in a certain sense until 1789—though the bourgeois section of French society had emerged long before—of Indian until the beginning of the period of emergence, which might tentatively be put in the 1880's. Society was stabilized in medieval England, as it was in an African tribe fifty years ago; this was also true of the Aztecs and the Incas, the Redskins and even, one might say, the Hottentots and Bushmen.

It is partly because they had emerged from this static condition into a dynamic society based on competition that the Europeans were able to establish themselves as rulers in the new countries they came to. Here, as we have seen, some of them endeavoured to stabilize the new relationship between themselves and the previous inhabitants. And at first it seemed as though this would work harmoniously. After the first stage of conquest and expansion there is usually a second stage in which tensions between the two kinds of society dis-

appear beneath the surface. The first clash is over, the dominant race are in a position of unquestioned strength and—in some cases at least—they adopt a paternal and benevolent attitude. The people of the dominated race at the beginning of this period feel admiration for the dominant culture and readily accept a position of dependence; they are themselves still in a static society and accustomed to direction from above. They may feel some relief at freedom from lawlessness and plunder; this is very marked, for instance, in Central India in the first half of the nineteenth century. Then comes a stage when leaders from the static society begin to emerge; they welcome the new culture and such great men as Booker T. Washington in the United States and Ram Mohun Roy in India visualize a future in which the two races will draw closer and closer together.

This phase however soon passes into the third, when the men of the dominated race have begun to absorb the new culture and are impatient for equality; they too are beginning to pass from a static to an open society and they turn back to their own traditions; the Westernizing Brahmo Samaj is displaced by the Arya Samaj which looks back to ancient Indian traditions. Meanwhile the dominant race becomes jealous for the position which it feels it may not be able to hold much longer. The settler's attitude changes; while in the earlier period he spoke with contempt of the stage of development reached by the tribesman or peasant and was eager for his ' improvement ' or ' development ', he begins now to idealize this primitive state. In Africa, he no longer speaks of ' a sea of black savagery ', as in the Victorian period; now his attitude may often be represented by such phrases as: ' The Native is all right in the reserves; it 's these educated creatures from the towns I can't stand '. Fifty years ago the Negro was hardly entering the third phase

in America; in the rest of the world he was not there at all, but the Asiatic was in the full tide of it. Now however the position has changed and the relation of dominance has in most cases passed away as between European and Asiatic, while the Negro is now well into the third phase in the United States and moving into it in Africa.

Considered in this light, feeling is not only sharper at the moment in the case of the Negro but it is likely to be worse in his case than it ever was in the Asiatic's, because the split with his own culture is so much greater.

Looking again at the regions of the world in the light of this analysis, one would expect race tensions to be most acute and the most stringent stabilizing devices to have been introduced in the country where there is a temperate climate, where the dominant race lives permanently and where some of its members are daily-paid labourers, where the dominated race is primitive and the dominant race Northern with a non-liberal tradition. And in fact this proves to be the case. Only one territory fulfils all these conditions.

The countries where the feeling is perhaps next most intense will be those where there is a temperate climate and white men can live permanently, where they are in contact with a primitive people and where the dominant race is Northern but has behind it a liberal tradition; in this category, of course, come the southern part of the United States, Kenya and the Rhodesias. In all these, stabilizing devices are at work, and the Rhodesias and Kenya are the most pressing at the moment, the one because of the recent Federation and white labour in the copper mines and the other because of land hunger among the dominated and a relapse into atavistic savagery, which is a typical feature of one stage of the cycle of dominance. Here one may add in an aside that such an atavistic relapse is to be expected where a group is in

the full tide of the transition from status to competition and where the control is slightly relaxed—not where repression is most severe; no Bastilles were stormed in Poland.

New Zealand might well be expected to come close behind these countries. The climate is temperate and the European is manifestly there for good. The previous inhabitants, although their civilization was a long way ahead of the Negro, were still nothing like so developed as those of India and perhaps not so much as Peru. They were a people transported from a Neolithic culture in less than a hundred years through a development on which in England we have spent more than two thousand. The fact that relationships are, superficially at least, so much better here than in, say, the United States, is probably due partly to the smallness of the national state and its unity on most political issues, and partly to the fact that there is no real poverty in the country and no great economic rivalry between the races. Again, the Europeans who went to New Zealand usually came from a class who expected to work for themselves; the territory started as a farm colony, not one of exploitation. And there was no slavery here, while the numerical relationship is also of importance. But it would be superficial to rule out the elementary possibilities that Maoris may be easier people to get on with than Negroes or that New Zealanders may have behaved better than the people of the southern United States—or both.

We are now aware of the circumstances in which stabilizing devices are introduced and have next to consider whether they can be justified, either as a permanent or as a temporary measure. This involves reconsidering the assumptions we refused to make about equality and it also involves recognizing the nature of certain moral judgments which we cannot avoid making.

IV

THE ANSWER OF BIOLOGY

Let us first take the possibility that there is some biological difference between races which would account for the different stages of development which are manifest at present and which might arguably justify some stabilizing device intended to keep races apart.

By definition there are biological differences between races, the most obvious being the form of the hair and the colour of the skin. But there seems no inherent reason to suppose that these particular differences are in any way connected with any qualities of importance to human behaviour. Among animals there are no grounds for thinking one colour better than another; a coloured horse is as likely as a white horse to win a race and is no different in temper, while it is easier to groom. The question is whether there are any other differences which in any way hamper or disqualify.

When this subject was broached a hundred years ago by such men as de Gobineau and others, it seemed to most of them self-evident that the Northern European was superior in energy and intelligence to the other peoples of the world, and it seemed to follow from the teaching of Darwin that it was in accordance with the cosmic order that he should rule them. It seemed hardly possible that so great a difference could be due to the kind of society in which people had grown up, and it is not unfair to say that science—or pseudo-science—at first deliberately searched for a biological difference

which would account for the difference of intellect and character which to common sense seemed obvious. More recently the scientist, severely objective though he has been, has not always been displeased to reach results which equate human beings with each other; this permits him with a clear conscience to think of men as though they were atoms or molecules.

Scientists thought at first that the answer might lie in cranial capacity but this proved to be far from the case. The differences within each race covered a much wider range than the differences between the averages of races; the largest individual cranial capacity from the race with the smallest average was above the average of the race with the largest average; as between individuals within a race there seemed no manifest superiority in the individual with the largest capacity. Nor did the averages of the races by any means fall into the order which had been expected, Eskimo, Javanese, and some Bantu tribes returning higher averages than French or English. What is more, Neanderthal men had a larger mean cranial capacity than that of modern populations, so that it may be argued that a smaller brain is an upward step.

Much importance was once attached to the shape of the skull. But again it is not easy to relate this to any mental excellence or degree of development, or indeed to other racial traits. Comparisons were made within Europe of townspeople and countrymen, of professional men and farm labourers, and it was thought that the long head went with initiative. But the theory broke down when the field of inquiry was extended. The Swede is long-headed and so is the Negro, while the Swiss is round-headed. There are also some indications that the shape of the skull is modified by environment; some figures suggest that the children of people with heads either extremely long or extremely short who migrate to

America are nearer the American median type than their parents, but this should be treated with some reserve.

Disappointed here, racialists turned to consider the folds and convolutions of the brain, but no significant difference emerged. The theory has also been disproved that by an earlier closing of the fontanelle the Negro brain is in some way sealed up and ceases to develop; nor has anything significant been found, given similar environments, in growth curves or the time of onset of menstruation. The thickness of certain laminae of the cortex of the brain were in one experiment found—in the case of tribal Africans—to reveal a significant difference from Europeans, but these laminae included immature cells which might have matured under different conditions of life. Again, a beginning has been made in the comparison of electric encephalograms for the two races, but nothing not attributable to environment has yet emerged.

Another physical feature which seemed likely to present some hope to those who look for significant racial differences was the basal metabolic rate, the rate at which food and air are turned into heat and energy. It was found—before 1939—that there was a significant difference of nearly 10 per cent in the basal metabolic rate of Chinese living in China and of Americans living in America. But further research showed that Chinese who moved to America increased their basal metabolic rate by about 8 per cent, while Americans living in China suffered a drop of about 5 per cent. There are, of course, considerable changes from day to day in the case of each individual which are directly attributable to emotion and which, in order to ascertain the basal rate, are as far as possible eliminated. In other words, it appears that environment, the general pace of life, and the climate are the most important factors here. The conclusions regarding blood pressure are similar.

A good deal of work remains to be done on the endocrine glands, the working of which at first seemed to show a significant difference between races. But it is well known that emotions affect the working of these glands at different times in the life of the individual and it is probable that the activity with which they function over longer periods varies with environment. This seems likely to account for the indications that they function in different proportions for different races. The question has not been finally settled, but it seems probable that if it is pursued the answer here too will be that environment is the main factor.

The racialists of the last century had at the back of their minds a picture of the savage as someone closer to nature than themselves and they expected to find the sight and hearing of people in primitive societies and of coloured people more acute than their own. The idea follows from the theories of Rousseau and was probably purely *a priori*, but may have received some confirmation because in a strange country the traveller cannot see things which are readily visible to the native, just as the beginner will not see nests when he goes birdsnesting. But no tests in modern times have indicated any significant difference between races in this respect, nor can any difference be found in nervous reflexes such as knee jerks or reaction to pain.

Much work has also been done on differences in taste perception. There are some people who taste certain chemicals, among which the most useful for experiment is known as PTC, and others who do not taste solutions of the same strength. Some people, for instance American Indians, show a notably higher proportion of tasters than others, for instance, the Welsh. But there seems no reason to suppose that this faculty is related to any mental superiority of mind or character. Indeed it is a

chemical curiosity, unrelated even to the ability to discriminate between other tastes, and it seems to be quite useless from the point of view of selective adaptation to environment. This is just what gives it value from the point of view of classification—but not from our point of view.

In the proportions in which the blood groups are found in different races there are differences which from certain points of view are of value. They are not of course visible to the outer eye and are therefore not a matter of prejudice; prejudice can have taken no part in building up the distinctions between groups of people among whom the blood groups are found in different proportions. In some other characteristics, such as the shape of the nose, an ideal of art, by affecting sexual selection, may have influenced the type, but blood groups—until quite recently in Canada and the United States—have played no part in sexual selection. Nor are they influenced by environment.

Here are some broad facts. Within Europe, there is a distinct difference between the west and the east; east of the Adriatic and the line of the Elbe, the B types of group occur more frequently than in Western Europe. In those parts of Europe this side of the Iron Curtain (roughly speaking) the A types predominate, except in Scotland, Ireland, parts of Wales and Iceland, where there is a much higher proportion of O. There is a combination of blood groups typical of a Mediterranean population. It is probable that the South American Indians belonged, before the coming of Europeans, all without exception to the O type; in North America, the Indians were O and A with a very high A frequency in the north-west. There is also the peculiarly African characteristic that the Rhesus factor is usually of the type known as Rh_o. Another African haematological charac-

teristic, which does not come under the head of blood groups, is the prevalence of the sickling trait, a tendency of the red blood-cells in certain circumstances to form shapes like sickles or holly-leaves; this is not found in Europeans, nor was it found in Asia until very recently among certain Veddoid groups in southern India who are thought to be pre-Dravidian aboriginals. The Bushman, who is thought to be the oldest human inhabitant of Africa, shows the Rh_o but not the sickling. It may therefore be that the Negro is the result of a mixture of Veddoid and Bushman types.

These results are of great value from the point of view of the classification of peoples and the history of their early migration. But from our practical point of view they can have no significance until it has been shown that there is some connexion between the occurrence of these particular kinds of blood groups and such human characteristics as intelligence or industry. This has not been done; it would appear to be a field in which research ought to be undertaken, although the result is not at all likely to be positive. One would want to know in the first place whether, within a race or nation, there was any obvious difference in the field of human success between people with different kinds of blood groups. Or can it be shown that a person with the sickle cell trait is incapable of higher mathematics?

The answer of biology, then, to the first question must be that biology is unable to detect any hereditary difference between races which would seem likely to involve any necessary superiority of mind or character on one side. But that is not to say that some superiority is not there. The answer which physical science gives to this problem is limited; only if it is positive can it help the inquiry. If the answer is negative, it means no more than that we must shift our ground. There is a difference in

achievement between the races which must be faced and taken into account. Not only that, but stabilizing devices are supported with passion and conviction; it would be to fly in the face of evidence to ignore that fact. It would be no use telling, let us say a South African miner or a Rhodesian farmer, that science states positively that there is no difference which has significance in the field of human development between himself and his Native employee. His reply is likely to be: ' Then the more fool science; there plainly is a difference. What is the reason?'

V

THE ANSWER OF STATISTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

THERE is in fact a fundamental limitation in the extent to which the methods of physical science can be applied to the realm of the human mind. The scientist cannot cut up an average man. He must cut up an actual man to discover whether he has, for instance, a gall bladder. It is a perfectly valid approach for physical science, and indeed the only approach possible, to cut up a thousand men, to find that each has a gall bladder, and to assume that the rest of mankind will also usually be found to have gall bladders, and that the functions of a gall bladder will not differ from one man to the next. But for the student of human behaviour, the same kind of assumption is not justified. Psychology too must proceed by studying individuals. There can be no psycho-analysis of the average man. But when a profound psychological study has been made of a thousand men, one by one, the kind of assumption which it was safe to make about gall bladders cannot safely be made. Intellectual equipment varies between man and man in a different way from physical equipment and there will be nothing in the material thus laboriously collected to ensure that the thousand and first man may not disappoint all predictions by being Leonardo da Vinci or Saint Francis of Assisi, Isaac Newton or Warren Hastings. It is true that some vestigial element of almost every known urge will be found in every man, but the sexual elements in the personalities,

for instance, of Dante, Casanova and Savonarola—or, to come nearer home, Pepys, Ruskin and Wilde—differ not in quantity but in quality. The differences between individuals are not only infinite in number but unpredictable in kind. It is possible to describe in scientific terms the urges and motives of one man or of a number of men, how those urges have been repressed, appeased or transmuted—but the full truth will not be there, because there is no instrument delicate enough to detect it. It is impossible in this realm to proceed to a general proposition with the confidence justified in a physicist or a biologist.

This applies with less force to the study of groups of people, because individual differences tend to disappear in the group, but it is not justifiable to assume that their behaviour is entirely predictable. It is not possible to say with certainty how a thousand individuals will behave when they form an excited mob, or the audience at a theatre, or for that matter how they will behave if they are put together on an uninhabited island and left there for the rest of their lives. No social biologist would have predicted Mr Churchill's offer to France in June 1940, and though Thermopylae might have come within his art, Marathon would have been a surprise to him.

All this is not to decry the value of the inductive physical sciences but only to say that they cannot tell the whole truth about human beings. In this particular field all they can hope to say is one or the other of two things. Either they may say that there is a difference between races, whether a bodily or a mental difference, so great that it hampers one race permanently in the field of human performance, or they may say that they cannot find a difference of that nature which can be measured in their quantitative terms. They cannot say that there is no difference. And in any case such an

answer would be far from satisfactory to observers who perceive an actual difference in achievement today.

With this warning in mind it is possible to pass on to the second approach which may be made to the question we have asked, the approach of statistical psychology. By this I mean the compilation of statistics about intelligence and character, an attempt to apply the methods of physical science to the measurement of the human intelligence. The most obvious example is the intelligence test, and here it is worth considering what it is that you are looking for in an intelligence test. Presumably it is a person who in the right environment will develop into a statesman, a scholar, a lawyer, a scientist, a manager, teacher or administrator. There are certain qualities we should like to see in such a man, such as quickness of apprehension, a good memory and the power of arranging facts and producing a synthesis. He needs, too, a sense of proportion, a sense of the practical, and some originality of thought. But none of these will carry him far without the power of concentration, a determination to complete his projects and the perseverance necessary to ensure that his ideas do not remain ideas but are actually carried out. He would also be the better for the power of expressing himself fluently, judgment of character, and the sensitivity needed to understand what other people feel.

Of all these characteristics, the intelligence test will undoubtedly indicate quickness of apprehension and to some extent memory of what has been observed. As to the power of arrangement, this is partly acquired but not entirely; attempts are made, with doubtful success, to detect this and allied faculties, but power of expression is deliberately discounted as being acquired, which is not entirely the case, while determination and the qualities that go with that come into pure intelligence tests hardly

at all. Everyone knows the kind of mind which is very quick in apprehension but is without originality or a sense of proportion. This is the kind of mind most likely to do well in an intelligence test. And again it is impossible to devise a test that will do justice to the late developer.

Today most intelligence testers are aware of the limitations of their method. In Klineberg's words: 'The history of mental testing of ethnic or racial groups may almost be described as a progressive disillusionment with tests as measures of native ability and a gradually increasing realization of the many complex environmental factors which enter into the result. . . .' But the limitations were not appreciated in the first world war when intelligence tests were applied in the American Army on a large scale and significant differences were seen in the results obtained from coloured soldiers and from white. The tests had been devised with the object of displaying not acquired but inherent intellectual power, and at first they seemed to justify all the assumptions that had been made about the lower intelligence of the Negro. It was only with greater experience that psychologists came to realize how great a part environment does play in the ability of a person to deal successfully with these tests. Negro children from the deep South, when asked, for instance, to write down the opposite of 'sweet', left blank papers because they did not know the meaning of 'opposite'. Their knowledge of language was insufficient for them to apprehend the question. Pictorial tests were then devised, but these too to some extent depend on background. It is no use telling a child to complete a picture of a house from which the chimney has been left out if it has never seen a house with a chimney. The first tests had therefore to be largely discounted and it would now generally be admitted that no tests have yet

been devised which will bring out inherited characteristics fairly as between people with different backgrounds. As between children with the same background, the tests give a reasonably fair indication of their quickness of apprehension—admittedly a most important point for a teacher.

Recognizing that the results of intelligence tests are necessarily limited but taking them as a rough indication at any rate of quickness of apprehension, it is possible in this field of statistics to make some allowance for different environments and to obtain results of a kind. In the deep South of America in 1936, in Mississippi and Georgia, the amount spent on the education of Negro children was 9 dollars per child per year, while for white children it was 45 dollars; for ten Southern States, the figures were 17 dollars for Negroes and 49 dollars for whites. Only twelve years earlier, figures quoted for Georgia were 2.83 dollars for a Negro child against 16.31 dollars for a white. In New York the same is spent on both and it is well above the white level in the South. It was not surprising then that Negro children whose parents had recently migrated to New York gave poor results in intelligence tests when compared with white children. But after a year in the same schools it was found that their results proportionate to their age were better; and throughout their school career they picked up a little each year. Again, the difference between Negro children born in New York and white children born in New York is very slight and is probably to be accounted for by the different levels of education in their homes. Negroes born in New York attain a better average than whites from the deep South who have recently migrated. And, whenever there has been anything like a comparable background, the results of the best Negroes have been better than the white average.

Attempts have also been made to express in numerical terms and compare such qualities as memory for tunes, preference for colours, power of sustained work—but in no case with results that seem to have any convincing relation to the problem of racial tensions. It is in the United States that most of this work has been done; if the difficulties of excluding environment have been great here, they are infinitely greater in Africa where backgrounds are so much wider apart. Biesheuvel in his monograph on *African Intelligence* concluded that it was virtually impossible to compare in numerical terms African and European intelligence in South Africa. It is a judgment which would apply with even greater force in Central or East Africa, where the impact of industrialism has been less.

Statistical psychology then returns the same report as biology. When allowance has been made for environment, no differences can be detected which are not greater within the races than between them and therefore no argument is provided which might justify domination. There is, however, room for more work in this field; it should be possible both to improve the tests and to cut out the environmental differences further.

VI

HISTORY, CLIMATE, DIET

The methods of physical science have then returned negative results. But this is not enough; we are faced by life and human beings, not by tables of statistics. It is no use showing tables of statistics to a man who has all his life been dealing with African miners and field hands. He will ask why Africans have made so insignificant a mark upon the world. He will ask why they have added no great buildings to humanity's achievement, why they never learnt to write or to plough, why in fact when Africans have been left to manage their own affairs, as in Liberia and Abyssinia, they have not been notably successful. He will point to the fate of the settlements of the Bastards in Griqualand and to other missionary settlements in South Africa which have fallen back—the springs silted up, the fields eroded, the houses unrepaired—as soon as missionary influence was removed. He will ask how it is that while he can teach Africans a skill, his employees never make any suggestion for improving the way the work is done. He will in short apply a pragmatic test.

But the moment the question is put in this pragmatic form it becomes apparent that here we enter the realm of moral judgment. It is quite clear that the questioner, practical man that he is, is making the ethical judgment that certain kinds of social achievements are ' better ' than others. There are moments when anthropologists, and for that matter government officials who have been in close contact with primitive tribes, seem inclined to question the judgment implicit in the practical man's question and to suggest that there is something ' better ' about the primitive society. Everyone, perhaps, has

sometimes felt the same. But this is to confuse a relative with an absolute value; tribal life may be ' better ' for a given individual at a given time but we cannot make the judgment that the tribe should be kept unchanged for ever. The majority of educated people for most of their waking lives will affirm unhesitatingly that Hellas—and even Birmingham—is ' better ' than Zululand. There is no need here to define a civilized and a primitive society, though it must be stressed again that a civilized society is not necessarily an open society; the classical Hindu society, for instance, was most highly civilized but was most definitely closed or based on status. The meaning is perfectly clear without definition and we know that with all the possibilities of evil to be found in civilization there are also possibilities of good and we regard it as a ' better ' achievement than the tribal state. That, however, is a moral judgment and we must recognize that we have made it. But we should also note that it does not follow that civilization is at any given moment ' better ' for any given individual, a point to which we shall have to come back.

Why then has Africa south of the Sahara produced no civilization? There are people who will tell you that it has, and it is true that we now know of more highly developed cultures in Africa's past than we once did. But if world history is considered with a sense of proportion, the question can surely stand unaltered. It is sometimes argued that the people of this area had no contact with civilized people and that isolation alone accounts for their standing still. This does not seem to be entirely true; they were less isolated than the Mayans or the Incas. Languages did spread across the Sahara and Dr Toynbee has pointed out that deserts and steppes seem, like the sea, to act as a means of communication so that resemblances are found between cultures and

languages all round their shores. Again, there were contacts on the upper waters of the Nile and along the sea coast, particularly on the east. And in any case the theory would seem to imply that progress in technology is made only by contact with other people, a dispersionist theory which few would now accept in its harshest and simplest form. It is now generally believed that such steps in human progress as the invention of the plough and the bow have occurred to different peoples independently. It is true however that the inhabitants of Africa south of the Sahara were left to themselves in the sense that they were never until the coming of the Europeans subject to widespread invasion by a more developed culture. 'Stimuli from abroad reached the interior in thin streams and with many interruptions,' wrote Westermann.

But if progress is sometimes made independently and not always learnt from other people, one may be fairly dogmatic that it is always made in response to some challenge by environment or circumstance. Dr Toynbee has quoted a mid-nineteenth century writer on Nyasaland who suggests that the Nyasas made no progress because they did not need to. 'Here in his virgin simplicity dwells Primeval Man, without clothes, without civilization, without learning, without religion—the genuine child of nature. . . . He has practically no wants. . . . He does not need to work; with so bountiful a nature around him it would be gratuitous to work. . . .' But it seems very doubtful whether the inhabitants of Nyasaland would have agreed that their life was so easy as this writer supposed. And if the growth of the Mayan civilization was a response to the challenge of the tropical forest, surely the forest of Nyasaland too presented a challenge. It may be that in the Congo basin the challenge was too severe for the inhabitants, but surely in the forest of Nyasaland a challenge was presented which the inhabi-

tants failed to accept. On the other hand, the challenge of the environment, whether in Nyasaland or in the high-veld, would have been more effective if the numbers of the population had been greater and it had not always been possible to move on.

Diet and disease, however, may well provide the most convincing of all replies to this pragmatic question. There are depressing reports from all over Africa of deficiency diseases and malnutrition. Night blindness, due to vitamin shortage, often appears in men who otherwise appear fit. Kwashiorkor, or malignant malnutrition, believed to be due to shortage of protein, occurs among small children in Kenya, the Cameroons, Nigeria, Uganda, the Gold Coast, and the Union; where children are so seriously short of protein as to contract this acute disease, it is not unreasonable to suppose—even if there was no other evidence—that the whole population is suffering from some degree of shortage. There is however no lack of evidence; scurvy, pellagra and tropical ulcers tell the same tale. In the Union in 1938, native boys of school age were reported to be suffering from malnutrition to the extent of 72 per cent in Pretoria and 90 per cent in Letaba. ' Up to the age of five years . . . the African child is too often a whining apathetic invalid . . .', says a medical writer quoted by Carothers. It does not of course follow, because the African is undernourished today, that he always has been; but some deficiencies in the past seem probable and there is no reason to suppose that parasitic troubles, the widespread incidence of hook-worm, tape-worm, bilharzia and the rest, are of recent origin. And these are slow wasting diseases, far more paralysing in their effects on a community than the kill-or-cure diseases such as plague and smallpox which were the scourges of Europe in the Middle Ages and Early Modern periods.

There have then been serious handicaps, but history cannot be said to return an entirely conclusive reply to this question. Much closer investigation of the subject is required. It is however worth remembering that it is approximately 350,000 years since man in a form biologically modern appeared on the earth's surface and that the history of which we have knowledge covers at the most 5,000 years. It is not therefore surprising to find that over so long a period some people have obtained a start over others. There was contact between the Mycenaean Bronze Age civilization and the people who built Stonehenge; a thousand years later Mycenae had developed into Athens but fifteen hundred years later the inhabitants of Britain were painting themselves blue and burning people alive in wicker cages. The most intolerant judgment passed on the African today might well have been passed on the German in the time of Tacitus and it would have been easy to conclude in the tenth century that European civilization was receding into barbarism, while Indian civilization at the same date compared poorly with that of the Guptas or the Mauryas six hundred and fourteen hundred years earlier. Go back only two hundred and fifty years and compare the poorer parts of London in the reign of Queen Anne with Moroka or Newclare or Sophiatown on the fringes of Johannesburg today, and it is impossible to conclude that the African slum-dwellers as compared with the English are more dirty, drunken, criminal, or callous of human life and suffering. Or, to come closer home, quote the Premier of Southern Rhodesia, who finds his African tribesmen today very like the people of the East End of London whom he used to doctor when first he was qualified. ' We are a people,' said an African character in a recent short story, ' still in God's dressing-room, still waiting to come on the stage.'

VII

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PERSONALITY

The theory is sometimes put forward that the failure of the Bantu people to develop more rapidly is due to a psychological structure of their personality, which differs from that of the average European, and that this can be traced to a certain contentment and dependence due to the way they are brought up in infancy. Dr Kark of Durban, who has been doing both medical and psychological work on this subject with the practical object of improving health, is of the opinion that the Bantu way of bringing up infants is 'better' because it produces a more balanced personality than the European. He believes that the Zulu child, who is never denied nourishment when he asks for it and who is always in close contact with his mother, does not develop the sense of frustration and anxiety which is so marked a feature of the European, whose life from a very early stage involves food at fixed periods and the acquisition of fixed habits.

This statement has only to be made for it to be plain that here another moral judgment is being stated by implication. If the Bantu's way of bringing up children is more likely to produce a balanced personality than the European, then a balanced personality does not seem to make for the kind of human progress our practical friend was taking as his criterion, and it looks as though some degree of frustration and anxiety was necessary for any advance. This is not to attempt to pronounce

judgment on the weaning theory, which may well be a valid reason for some differences in behaviour—though it provides no explanation for the widely differing characteristics of tribes who follow the same practice in weaning nor for such a change as the aggressiveness which became a Zulu characteristic at the end of the eighteenth century. Again among East African tribes, at least, early maternal indulgence is suddenly and violently ended; weaning and training in excretory behaviour now take place at the same time and almost in a day, a circumstance which must affect personality. All that is certain is that here is another implied moral judgment, which is contrary to the one we noticed last. It becomes more clear than ever that it is very difficult indeed to avoid making moral judgments in this discussion and that one must be constantly alert to detect them. Here the implied judgment is one answer to the old schoolboy dilemma of whether it is ' better ' to be a contented pig or a discontented philosopher; the judgment about civilizations and primitive societies implies the other answer.

Dr Kark's work has not yet been published and I have only heard the gist of his conclusions, but his view that the majority of Bantu men are much less the victims of frustration and anxiety than most Europeans is endorsed by the observation of most people who know them. But that the Bantu personality is built up from the same fundamental elements as that of the Westerner is shown by the psycho-analysis of an individual African published by Dr Sachs under the title of *Black Hamlet*. The subject, who was selected at random, was found to display a strongly developed Oedipus complex and indeed the whole Freudian apparatus. Still more illuminating are the generalizations of O. Mannoni in *Psychologie de la Colonisation*.

This book is an analysis of the colonial situation in Madagascar after the 1947 rebellion. The generalizations are made with special reference to the people of Madagascar, who are neither Negro nor Bantu, but they seem to have application very much more widely wherever people are in transition from a static to an open society. Sir Henry Maine showed more than seventy years ago that the primitive societies of the ancient Roman and Hellenic world, of such ancient European tribes as he had knowledge of, and the primitive Indian village community, were based on status rather than contract. Not everyone today would agree that contract was the distinguishing mark of the open society, while I have already suggested that the condition of status was not confined to primitive societies and is indeed normal for mankind. But the distinction remains broadly valid. In the open society, which Maine thought of as based on contract, the individual is a unit; his relations with his fellows are those he makes for himself, by competition, by contract, by adverse possession. To Maine, this progress seemed one that developed steadily; we in our day face a swing back towards the closed and static society, a retrogression which he did not contemplate.

Be that as it may, the Madagascan before the arrival of Europeans seems to have existed in just the condition of status described by Maine. His place in the tribal hierarchy was fixed, and not only that but he also took his place in the gradation between the ancestors whom he worshipped and the children he must produce to nourish his own cult. He was thus entirely without that anxiety about his relation to other people which characterizes the modern European. Such ideas as competition, progress, and change were alarming to him; all that he required was certainty, security, and a system on which

to depend. This may be compared with a description of the psychology of the tribal African by J. C. Carothers, who was for nine years a general medical officer and for twelve years in charge of a mental hospital in Kenya. ' The individual ', he writes, ' is integrated in his society—not in himself.' And again: ' In regard to the strivings for independence and personal responsibility that characterize European adolescence, African culture recognizes this and firmly stamps it down. If any basic independence has survived the years of childhood, or if any faint resurgence of this occurs at adolescence, it is one aim of initiatory ritual and of circumcision to destroy its general expression. . . .' Static society, in short, has no use for individual differences of character and opinion or for competitive strife.

To revert to Mannoni, the arrival of Europeans was not at first realized by the Madagascan as a threat to his security; when however it became apparent that the Europeans did not accept the tribal system or the edicts of the ancestors and that they were immune from magic forces and in possession of superior skills which to him seemed supernatural, he avoided the difficulty by transferring to the Europeans his sense of dependence. He called them his father and mother and even used of them a word applicable to his tribal gods. This represents the second or paternal stage in the cycle of dominance I have outlined in Chapter III. In this stage, it is useless to expect ' the native ' to be ' keen on his job '; he does what he has to do because he is told to do it and he is most unlikely to think about it and suggest improvements; he does not ' want to get on ' in the European sense. He makes a good servant or a good soldier, ' provided you tell him exactly what to do '.

But the time comes when the Madagascan—or whoever it may be, for the analysis is applicable to almost any

static society—having developed some knowledge of Western ideas, finds himself expected to behave as though he were a fully-fledged member of a competitive and contractual society. He will perhaps at this stage find himself unemployed or underpaid and dependent on his own efforts to provide the means of feeding his family. There is an end of the old static relation of dependence on the paternal figure of a farmer or a missionary. Instead there appears an impersonal boss, an exploiter, who is not interested in the individual at all, and the Madagascan is in a cold competitive world where he must look after himself. He is likely to feel that he has been abandoned, betrayed, and deserted; his former sense of dependence on the European will turn to one of hostility and he may revert sharply to older gods. If, on the other hand, he is told that he is not yet sufficiently mature to take the step to freedom, his resentment will be just as sharp. Metaphors are always misleading as well as instructive, but it is a useful metaphor to compare a person emerging from a static society with an adolescent who wants freedom to go where he likes but at the same time expects his father to pay the fare. Even in an open society, every individual must go through this stage, which is usually painful to both parties. It is doubly painful for anyone brought up in a close society.

This analysis of the psychological effects of the transition from a static to an open society is of course worked out in much greater detail by Mannoni; the special application of his book to the Madagascar rebellion of 1947 makes it none the less relevant not only to the situation throughout Africa today and particularly in Kenya, but also to such incidents of the past as the Indian Mutiny and the Hau-Hau movement in New Zealand. It is completed by a similar analysis of the effect on the European of domination in what Mannoni calls a colonial situation,

that is to say, in the presence of a stabilizing device. But that is not relevant to this part of our argument.

Here is at least the beginning of an answer to the practical questions put forward by the business man. Handicapped by malnutrition, disease and isolation, the people of Africa have remained in the binding grip of a static culture. Individuals brought up in such a culture will not try to make their way in the world but look for a nook where they may safely remain in dependence. They will live in the moment, carefree, irresponsible and happy. In fact—as Carothers points out—their condition described in clinical terms is curiously like that of Europeans on whom the operation of frontal leucotomy has been performed. This operation, which isolates the frontal lobes of the brain, may sometimes appear to cure anxiety and the neuroses that arise from it but seems also to destroy foresight and altruism, the supreme social virtues. The African's frontal lobes seem on his first introduction to a dynamic society to rest idle; their work in the past has been done by the tribal structure. But of course leucotomy has not been performed; there is no reason why eventually a new environment should not stimulate the frontal lobes to activity.

This is an immense field within which very little work has been done. But the vital point has emerged that there is no inherent difference in the elements which make up the psychological structures of Madagascan, African and European; what is profoundly different is the social structure within which the personalities develop. It is a difference which is likely to be felt in every aspect of the personality and every action of the people concerned. The change from status to competition, which in Western society was taking place naturally from about the time of the Black Death onwards, has been forced suddenly on to the peoples of Africa and must constantly lead to rebel-

lions and retrogressions similar to those of adolescence. An understanding of the mental processes at work can therefore only be achieved by means of a study of individuals within the framework of a society.

Here some collateral guidance may be obtained from the lines on which social anthropology has developed during its short existence. It was once possible to compare customs on the basis of external resemblances wherever they might occur. If the heroes of Homer, the men of the round barrows of the South Downs, and the Vikings erected a mound over the dead, it was interesting to look for other examples of the same practice and, having found them, to argue—or to leave understood the implication—that some innate characteristic in humanity impelled people to behave in this way. Later, the same magpie habit of collecting customs was held to prove that cultures all grew from a parent stock. But the methods neither of *The Golden Bough* nor of the dispersionists would be accepted today, at any rate in England, where social anthropology would argue that a custom must be considered in relation to the entire social background and way of living of the people discussed.

This parallel can be applied to race relations, which should surely consider the way in which relations have grown up between two races against the historical, economic, and social background of the two peoples concerned. We have reached at least some indication of the method to pursue, and the essence of the method must be that while the individual, his thoughts, motives, and emotions, can only be understood in terms of the group to which he belongs, he himself must never be lost sight of and it must never be forgotten that human beings cannot be treated as molecules. The historical narrative must be supplemented by a psychological analysis, not only of the society but of the individual. It

will be a useful step to provide some numerical scale in terms of which comparison can be made between one person's attitude and another's; it will be useful too to know how many people of a particular class would accept a particular statement as representing their attitude. But the reduction of human beliefs to percentages can only be a step and must always involve some falsification. In the last analysis, truth will be found deep in the individual human personality.

VIII

GENETIC MIXTURE

So far then there is an answer, definite but negative, from biology and statistical psychology, to the effect that these sciences can detect no inherent inferiority in the Negro races that would justify the imposition of stabilizing devices. But from history and from analytical psychology the answer received, though less definite, seems likely to lead to a more complete truth and provides an indication of the method we ought to pursue. From these two the somewhat reserved reply is that the people of Africa have been handicapped by isolation, by diet and disease, by the fact that their small numbers and large spaces have made it easy for them to move on. But their psychological structure, though profoundly modified by the society in which they live, is not basically different from anyone else's, while among the comparatively few who have successfully made the transition from status and dependence to a dynamic competitive world, there are, we know, men of an intellectual stature comparable with any in the world.

The differences in mentality and character so far disclosed seem mainly due to environment, but that is not to say that heredity has no part to play. It would indeed be strange if the processes of evolution, which have selected so distinctive a pigmentation, should have made no selection among the genes which influence mental powers and character. But, whatever one might expect, the evidence we have so far considered does not disclose any difference which is expressible in quantitative terms and which

could not disappear in a different environment. One may legitimately continue to expect a qualitative difference, the kind of qualitative difference that does exist between a man's mind and a woman's, or between an aural and a visual memory, but there is no evidence for any racial difference which could prevent one race from attaining the same cultural and intellectual level as the others. But there might all the same still be an argument for devices intended to prevent social mixture if it seemed likely that genetic mixture would produce offspring necessarily inferior to either parent—and if it seemed likely that genetic mixture would occur. And even if this is not so, there may be an argument for a device intended to stabilize society for a short period only.

Here at once two fundamental difficulties are encountered. It is impossible to isolate human beings as in a laboratory and to consider a ' control ' case; in the case encountered naturally it is extremely difficult to say how much effect environment has had but the surrounding society has usually been hostile. There is also the fact that, where there is opinion hostile to mixed unions, they will normally take place between persons who have less self-control and less thought for the future than others, and their children will reproduce these qualities. Again, it will sometimes happen that the partner from the dominant race had a small field of choice because he was inferior in the qualities generally held in esteem and could not find a mate of his own race.

In default of a pure ' control ' case it is not unreasonable to consider the results of mixed strains among animals, although of course this cannot give a conclusive result because we are concerned with qualities more difficult to measure than meat or wool or eggs. Still, it is worth considering that a cross between two good strains does produce something known as ' hybrid vigour ' and

that such stock has often greater resistance to disease than the pure-bred stock. And achievement, in the field of success for which a domestic animal is bred, has come by an intensified form of just that crossing, alternating with isolated inbreeding, which seems to have been the historical fate of most human populations. The modern racehorse was the result of the importation of Arab and Barb stock; the Derby winner of today is certainly much faster than his ancestor the Godolphin Arabian.

And in history mixed races seem to do well. Spain, for example, had no sooner expelled the Moors, who had added their quota to an already very mixed stock, than she founded overseas her immense empire in America; Russia expelled the Mongols and became a nation. Scandinavians, grafted on to northern French, overran England, France, southern Italy and Syria. Indeed, there is no European race which is not mixed, and English and German are probably more mixed than most; it might well be argued that hybrid vigour is exactly the quality that Western Europe has displayed in the last five centuries.

This of course applies to mixtures between races with some similarity between them and not to so wide a divergence as between European and Negro—though the Portuguese achievement was not to be despised and there was certainly some African genetic element in Portugal from pre-Christian times, which was reinforced about the time of the Renaissance. The Brazilians, most mixed of any modern nation, claim that, in spite of a diet which until recently was short of protein, they show more vigour than any other tropical people. Altogether, the answer of history as well as biology must be rather favourable than the reverse to mixture. And examples of isolated—and therefore homogeneous and stabilized or approximately ' pure '—races developing a culture which can be

regarded as either vigorous or advanced are hard to find. Indeed, if a climate of opinion can be found in which the children will not suffer, the only valid argument which can be brought against mixed marriages is that the backgrounds are likely to be incompatible and the question therefore seems to be one for individuals to settle. But the strength of the sentiment against them is such that there may be a reason undisclosed and it may have some validity; it may be worth returning to this point and trying to discover why feeling should be so strong.

IX

THE REASONS FOR RACIAL FEELING

But if devices intended to stabilize race relations seem to be based on hypotheses which at their best are not proven, it remains to account for the fact that they are imposed. And it is much easier to say what are not the reasons than what are. It does not seem that the barriers are based on an aversion which is innate between the races themselves, something comparable with the dislike which most people feel of snakes and some of cats. There are plenty of examples of races living happily side by side and plenty of examples of fusion; and not only this but even within a society where there is obviously considerable racial tension, smaller units will be found in which the relationship is good, as for example the Afrikaner farm on the veld far away from the cities, where a real affection between individuals of the races is said often to exist. Nor do children seem to feel any aversion for people of another colour until it is taught them. And in dangerous stretches of a mine, in war, at sea, on hunting expeditions, or on mountains, race is forgotten. Indeed, it is the anxiety to avoid fusion which leads to stabilizing devices. If there was deep and permanent aversion there would be no fear of fusion and no need for such barriers.

The feeling, then, if it is not innate and natural, must be induced and it must be due to something in the history of the contact between the races, treating history here in the fullest possible sense in which it includes the present. And no explanation will be satisfactory which does not

account not only for the desire to avoid fusion but for the belief that it is likely to occur.

Dr Kenneth Little has suggested, in one context, that race feeling arose as a result of the capitalist system and that it was not until men began to exploit their fellow men and treat them as property in the eighteenth century that race feeling arose. The argument, one may presume, is that exploitation produced a guilty conscience. But surely ' . . . Seius, whose eight hundred slaves Sicken in Ilva's mines' looked on them as property just as much as the American plantation owner; the difference was that they were of mixed races and many of them of the same colour as Seius. The first English convicts sent, like Moll Flanders, to America were virtually slaves and if the stigma was one of slavery only it is not clear how it became applied to the descendants of blackslaves only and not of white. There was slavery in Brazil more recently than anywhere else but less race feeling, and when Dr Little excludes Brazil by arguing that capitalism was fully developed only in the northern European countries, one must bring forward Jamaica, the colony of a highly capitalized northern state. Here too slavery was strong and race tension is mild. Again, the feeling is strongest in South Africa today and in South Africa slavery, though undoubtedly a factor, never spread very far from the Cape, and was never capitalistic as it was in Jamaica.

The class war was most bitter in Britain and North America and capitalists certainly had some reason to examine their consciences in the nineteenth century; but in both these territories, where the ' working class ' were of the same colour as the employers, recruits to the ranks of the employers were constantly being made and no great intolerance was shown to them; the mill worker's grandson took his seat in the House of Lords. If race

feeling is merely intensified class feeling with the added touch of a perpetual visible uniform on either side, it is again difficult to understand why it should be strong in South Africa, a country of isolated farms and among a people to whom industrialism has always been repugnant. Nor is the view convincing that race feeling among the English only arose after the industrial revolution. When Iago says to Brabantio: 'You'll have your daughter covered with a Barbary horse; you'll have your nephews neigh to you; you'll have coursers for cousins and gennets for germans', he was not only displaying his own racial prejudice but appealing to something which was there in Brabantio—and in the audience. Yet on the Elizabethan conscience there could be no guilt caused by exploitation.

Another and very different reason for racial aversion which is often given is personal smell; it is also quoted as a concomitant of sexual attraction, the suggestion being that an odour repulsive in other forms of association may be attractive in sexual contact of a particularly animal kind. It is said that the repulsion is present on both sides. One may guess that in this talk of body scent there is sometimes an element of imagination; children, who are highly sensitive to personal scent, seldom complain of attendants from other races, though this may be due to familiarity. But of course a different diet does mean a different smell; to be shaved by a Marseillais is an unforgettable experience. And a manual worker in a hot climate with a small wardrobe will smell strong, whatever his race; the smell will vary with what he eats and how often he washes and therefore with his culture, which is of course often confused with race. Hindus dislike the smell of Muslims as much as that of Europeans; it is diet not race that is the cause.

There is a well-known story from the United States of an abolitionist before the Civil War who was overpowered

on a hot day by the presence of a large slave woman, whose Southern mistress found her in no way offensive. And this represents a truth; those who are most repelled initially by physical differences are those least familiar with the other race and are not those who believe in race barriers. To them they do not seem necessary. Barriers are not built against repulsion but against attraction. They are not built at first contact by strangers; they are built by people familiar enough to have lost the sense of strangeness. Probably those who give emphasis to smell as a reason for aversion are dimly aware that the aversion comes from the sub-conscious and are reluctant to face the sexual aspect, of which more later.

Surely it is nearer the truth to think of the feeling as primarily one of fear, taking many different forms. There are fears of all kinds, some of them well-grounded in a thoughtful prognosis of what is likely to happen, others irrational because based on something which has not been faced. There is the vague and simple fear of something strange and unknown, there is the very intelligible fear of unemployment, and the fear of being outvoted by people whose way of life is quite different. There are fears for the future and memories of fear in the past, fears given an extra edge by the class conflict, by a sense of guilt, by sex and conscience, and by the fact that a hard line of separation has been drawn. Fear may also act as a catalytic agent, changing the nature of factors previously not actively malignant, such as the association in metaphor of the ideas of white and black with good and evil. And there is a great significance in numbers. Where the dominant are in the minority they are surely more frightened, and doubly so if they are confronted with some kind of hostile opinion among people from whom on purely racial grounds they might expect to draw allies. But it would be easy to push the question of

numbers too far; there is no question of a smooth curve on a chart. As a rule, where the white minority is very small the necessity of some concessions to the majority is perceived and there is less bitterness on the whole where the European is one to a hundred than where he is one to three.

Here, surely, in fear, with its many branches and its roots deep below the ground, is something nearer the truth—but let us postpone any attempt to list the forms that fear may take. We have so far reached only one certain conclusion, and that concerns the method by which we ought to proceed. Of course, in an essay of this length, it is impossible to consider in detail the history of one society and the development of race feeling in the individuals who compose it. But let us all the same attempt a brief historical analysis of the development of race feeling in the Union of South Africa. This should be enough to show whether the method is likely to yield results and whether we are so far on the right lines.

But before beginning, a preliminary warning is needed. It is probably impossible to discuss this question, or for that matter any other, except in the light of a set of values, moral standards, or principles. Yet in a sense the whole story is one of the conflict between two sets of values, an English political doctrine which is explicit and an Afrikaner doctrine which is not so easy to define because it is now in process of modification. It is difficult to be fair between these doctrines; for an Englishman, steeped in the tradition which has produced one of them, it is probably impossible. All one can do is to try to set out both as sympathetically as possible, to consider how far each is consistent with itself and how far its exponents have lived up to it, to find out if possible why the difference has arisen, and in the end to leave the reader to judge between the two.

X

RACIAL ASPECTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

As everyone knows, the Dutch East India Company founded the Cape as a station for the provision of fresh water, meat, and vegetables to ships on their way to the Dutch East Indies. It was soon found however that the Bushmen and Hottentots, who were the only inhabitants of the country round the Cape, belonged to so primitive a society that it was not easy to do business with them on any large scale; to provide a more reliable source of meat and vegetables the first settlers from the Low Countries were brought out. They were peasants, and from the start they were looked on with some scorn by the officials of the Company, a regard they returned with dislike and hostility; they soon learnt to rely on themselves for defence against the Hottentots and here there must have originated the slightly anarchic tendency which has been a feature of the Boer nation ever since.

It is however distinguishable from the lawlessness of the Americans. In the United States—which are politically the offspring of Rousseau and the French encyclopaedists as well as Coke and Blackstone—there has always been a conception of natural law higher than the written law of the land. If men felt that the law of the land in its application fell short of what they regarded as natural justice they took things into their own hands and carried out their own sentence. This has not been

the case in South Africa, where the Afrikaner of the farms has rather been inclined to regard written law with the veneration of a people who do not read much, but a people sturdily independent, ready to look after themselves, and anxious to see as little of the law as possible.

They were of course Calvinist by religion, deeply conscious of the burden of sin and of the doctrine of predestination. By the end of the seventeenth century, their Calvinism was reinforced by an influx of Huguenots, who had left France rather than recant from their religion and whose Calvinism was even more rigid than that of the Low Countries.

In 1657 there were at the Cape a total of a hundred and thirty-four Europeans of whom six were women. It is not surprising then that by 1671 only one-quarter of the children born to slaves were reputed to be the children of slave fathers. The slaves had been imported from other parts of Africa and from the Far East, particularly Malaya. They were at first—and in theory—released as soon as they were converted to Christianity; it was felt to be morally impossible for one Christian to hold another in slavery. In those early days the line of demarcation was two-fold, between Christian and pagan and again between free and slave. Since, however, all those who were pagan were in fact black and all who were slaves were black or brown, colour came to be associated with paganism and slavery.

Here it would be worth while studying in detail how far the use of such terms as ' Christian ' and ' pagan ' instead of racial terms really represented the current attitude, even in the seventeenth century, and how far the use was a rationalization of an already hardening race attitude in terms of an outlook that was becoming obsolete. The broad facts however are that although at one time it was socially possible in the Cape to sit down to a

meal with a ' free black ', by the end of the eighteenth century this was not so. The Dutch settlers were shocked and horrified by the behaviour of English and Hollander missionaries, led by Philip and van der Kemp, who came to the Cape in the first years of the nineteenth century under British rule and who attempted to put into practice ideas of the equality of man derived from Rousseau. Some of them believed they ought to share the diet and way of life of the people in their charge. Some of them even married Hottentot women.

British officials did not go so far as this. Most of the country was administered by amateur Landdrosts and Field Cornets, but the Governor as a rule came out with mildly liberal intentions and mildly liberal instructions. He was no doubt usually scared out of his liberalism before long, but such direction as was received from England seemed—from a South African point of view—all to tend in one direction. The laws which had condemned Hottentots as vagrants unless they were employed by Europeans were repealed in 1828; in 1834 came the abolition of slavery. Here is the reaction of Anna Steenkamp, sister of Piet Retief; she gives as a reason for the Great Trek: ' the shameful and unjust proceedings with reference to the freedom of our slaves: and yet it is not their freedom that drove us to such lengths, so much as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and religion, so that it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; wherefore we rather withdrew in order to preserve our doctrines in purity ' (J. Bird, *Annals of Natal*, vol. i, p. 459, quoted by MacCrone and Marquard). And there are other instances from the same period of genuine horror at the idea that a Christian—*scilicet*, a white man—should be punished for an offence against a native.

Here already the two standards of value are becoming apparent. Sir Theophilus Shepstone summarized the British view on the 29th October 1850:

> Whilst humanity and . . . the injunctions of our religion compel us to recognize in the Natives the capability of being elevated to perfect equality, social and political, with the White Man, yet it is as untrue as it would be unwise to say that the Native is, . . . in his present state, capable of enjoying or even understanding the political rights of the White Man.

In 1858, the Constitution of the Transvaal affirmed with equal clearness a different attitude: ' The people will admit no *gelijkstellung* between the White and the Coloured inhabitants, either in Church or State.' *Gelijkstellung* is usually translated ' equality ' but for this the Afrikaans equivalent is ' *gelijkheid* '; *gelijkstellung* really means ' equalizing ', a movement towards equality. While, therefore, Shepstone's pronouncement clearly states that there is potential equality and implies that actual equality will at least come nearer, the Afrikaner specifically repudiates any steps that might bring actual equality nearer and does not pronounce on potential equality.

It is clear that by this time the obvious visual difference between black and white had taken so strong a place in people's minds that it had obliterated older and less visible distinctions between Christian and pagan, slave and free. And in the world in which the Boer farmers found themselves after the Great Trek there was little to disturb the picture they had made for themselves of the coloured peoples. It was a patriarchal life in which the Boer farmer with his family and his African dependents was master of all he could see; traditionally if he saw smoke on the horizon he felt it was time to move on. Few if any pastors went with the trekkers; in order to be married they must go back to the Cape and here they

were shocked by what seemed a godless way of life; the word ' liberal ' applied to the Cape policy came to convey to them the significance that ' Jacobin ' carried to an English squire in the years after Waterloo, that ' Bolshevik ' carried a hundred years later. In the *platteland* the farmer saw only his black labourers, whom he treated as his children and over whom he exercised complete command; the only other Africans he saw were Bushmen, Hottentots and the Bantu. The Bushmen, writes Professor MacCrone, he ' regarded as a kind of dangerous vermin to be shot at sight ' and there is ample supporting evidence. A Hottentot asked van der Kemp ' if it were not true that God had created them as well as the Christians and the beasts of the field, for you know, he said, that the Dutch farmers teach us that He never created us nor taketh any notice of us.' With the Bantu clashes were more formidable; they were a numerous and warlike people who, like the Boers, knew only one remedy for poor crops—to move on. They were themselves, like the Boers, on the move, extending south and west. The wagons grouped in a laager with thorn bushes stuffed between the wheels, the rush of yelling savages with tossing plumes and brandished spears, the heroic burghers aiming and firing while their women load the rifles—that is a picture to be found hanging on the walls of many homes in South Africa. And many South African minds are furnished with similar pictures, with memories of the massacre of Retief and of Blood River.

It is worth noting that while the Protestants who took the Bible to North America can still communicate in English with the people of England, while the French émigrés to Canada can still talk to the people of France, the Afrikaner's spoken language has developed into a tongue distinct from that of Holland. He took with him the Bible in High Dutch and read it every day, for it was

not translated into Afrikaans until twenty years ago, but the spoken language was changing continually because hardly anything was ever written. Quite recently there were homes in which no other book but the Bible was allowed.

The Voortrekkers then were a solitary and simple people, courageous and self-reliant, deeply religious, hospitable and kindly, essentially a people to whom there were no gradations between plain right and plain wrong. They had fled the Cape to escape from the British, who seemed to them godless and materialist, dangerously and indeed wickedly equalitarian and liberal. But no escape was possible from the changing world of the nineteenth century, the world of wealth and wickedness. The British would not leave them alone. Gold and diamonds brought the Afrikaners into the orbit of the material developments of the century and ended alike the farm system of the Boer and the clan system of the Bantu.

So far we have thought of the Afrikaner; let us turn now to the English, those Victorian English whose strength at sea and whose industrial leadership were as yet unquestioned, whose achievements in science and politics were unrivalled and in literature impressive, who were convinced that their world-wide dominion was ordained by the Almighty in the best interests of the people over whom they ruled. People so sure of themselves and so sure of divine favour could hardly expect to be popular with Continental Europeans, still less with so small and isolated a nation as the Afrikaners. Because he was so lofty and remote, it was irritatingly easy for the Englishman to say that one day the African would be his equal; obviously they were not equals today, while as to the future, the English could go somewhere else, to England, to New Zealand; there was plenty of choice. It was easy, therefore, to take Shepstone's view that the

barrier was cultural and would be cured by time. It was easy for the administrators and politicians to agree to a common voter's roll for Europeans, Cape Coloured, and Africans—with, of course, qualifications as to property and education that for the present would leave Europeans a preponderance of power.

It was less easy for a merchant in Durban to look with liberal eyes at the Indian who was his rival in business; still less for a Kimberley miner at the lashing-boy who worked by his side and who might one day learn his skill. Here were people who inevitably found it was their interest to stabilize the existing position, that is to say, their existing advantage, by discriminatory devices.

The way was made easier by discriminatory devices which were defensible as in the interests of the African. The English official doctrine was that all men should be equal before the law. But when society is static, such equality may operate as oppression. In the West Punjab, for instance, property in land was created by the English soon after their arrival in 1846 and bestowed on the occupiers, on peasants who had never before been able to alienate land; it had previously belonged to the village community. Now each man could use the land as security for a mortgage and the doctrine of equality before the law permitted the moneylenders to filch the land, plot by plot, until the English were forced to right the wrong which—in their liberalism—they had committed. This they did in a measure which, by restricting the purchase of land to certain classes, made men once more unequal before the law and permitted them to preserve their rights. It was discrimination, theoretically illiberal, but entirely in the interests of people otherwise defenceless.

In the same way, in South Africa, complete equality before the law was not likely to provide justice for the

African who was still in a tribal society. He needed, for example, discriminatory legislation to protect him against the white man's liquor, but such benevolent discrimination as this paved the way for discrimination that was not benevolent. Land Acts, for instance, which purported to protect the African were gradually replaced by Acts which restricted him. Wages had at one time been fixed to protect the servant against exploitation; but that was hardly the unmixed intention of the Civilized Labour Policy and the Industrial Conciliation Acts, which exclude Africans from the definition of employee and therefore from the operation of the Acts.

Here then were two peoples of European stock, one a small people of farmers, deeply religious, deeply concerned for the country where they lived, seeing things simply in terms of right or wrong, black or white, seeing an obvious difference between themselves and the Bantu and regarding it as a matter of heredity and race, unchangeable and ordained by the nature of the Cosmos; the other an imperial people, arrogant, casual, detached, as liberal as Gallio, ready to concede the Bantu an equality that was long enough deferred—but whose lower strata were quick to sacrifice theory when their own interests were threatened.

The clash between the two peoples came, and there is no need to labour here the whole history of relations between Boer and British, to rehearse the tale of the two Anglo-Boer wars and the Jameson Raid; their importance is obvious and the facts are well known. No Englishman today would defend the Raid and few the wars; no one would deny that the English made mistakes and failed in understanding. But it is necessary to emphasize the memories which survive of the concentration camps for women and the deaths there from dysentery. What-

ever were the intentions, those are not things easily forgotten.

And in the immediate post-war period the salient impression on the minds of most Afrikaners was not the political generosity of the Peace of Vereeniging and the Act of Union, but the everyday facts that in any small town the minor public servants, the postmaster, the policeman and stationmaster, seemed always to be English, that English must be used for almost every transaction, while their own language seemed to be regarded as a backward and rustic dialect. To this resentment was added the feeling that, while the Boers belonged to South Africa and it was their home, the English were visitors who still spoke of England as home. It has to be realized that the whole experience was at least as sharp a humiliation for the great majority of the Afrikaners as the carpet-bagging episode in the history of the sixteen Southern States. Resentment at English actions and English attitudes has sharpened Afrikaner reactions to liberal views on the Native question, because those views are traditionally associated with England and regarded as mere hypocrisy. And it may be that some of these aggressive feelings towards the English have been transferred to the Native.

After the Act of Union, the white electorate were divided on linguistic and cultural lines, as they are today, between about 56 per cent Afrikaans-speaking and 44 per cent English-speaking. But among the Afrikaners were some educated in the Cape tradition who on the whole accepted Shepstone's doctrine of an ultimate possible equality. These combined with the majority of the English-speaking element to work the Act of Union and to govern the country, and it was widely believed in England that the comparatively liberal Cape tradition would spread northward. In fact the reverse has

occurred. In 1910 it had been possible to regard an educated African as a rare exception, while to have looked forward to a time when a large part of the continent might be ruled by African voters would then have seemed fantastic. But in the course of forty years that fantasy has grown steadily nearer while more and more of the white voters have felt themselves threatened by the economic rivalry of the African. At the same time, Africans have become politically conscious and much more insistent that their claims should be heard, while world opinion has also become a force and is no longer exclusively white opinion.

XI

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PLAN

The South African white electorate are faced then with a problem which the majority regard as nothing less than their continuance as a nation. Looking at the forms of parliamentary democracy, they argue with a good deal of historical justification that it is impossible to keep the franchise at an artificial level; the parties standing for election will compete against each other for the favour of the unfranchised, which they will try to win by giving them the vote. They point to Victorian England, to India and to Ceylon as proof. If, then, they argue, we grant direct representation to Africans, however it may be qualified, ' Native pressure for fairer treatment than they are receiving at present will not only increase greatly but may ultimately become irresistible' (SABRA: *Integration or Separate Development?*). And the argument goes on to pronounce unjustifiable the assumption that, once he has the vote and the majority, ' the Bantu will act differently and more fairly towards the European population than the Europeans were or are prepared to be towards the Native population.' All this of course depends on the assumption that votes in Africa will always be given on a racial rather than a party basis.

The majority then of the white electorate picture a world in which they would be out-voted by the Bantu proletariat and they feel that such a situation would be intolerable. It is the white electorate that has made South Africa; they found bush and desert and have made

a modern state, built cities and railroads, dug mines, created wealth. There can be no comparison with India or Egypt. They have, besides, nowhere else to go; they cannot return to their countries of origin, which are various and with which their connexion was severed hundreds of years ago; they have no powerful friends to help them; they must therefore maintain their independence and that means their political leadership.

A refusal either to leave or to accept a subordinate position in the land where your ancestors were born is a basis for national policy that can hardly be impugned. And it is logical to believe that white South Africans must stand on the one line which is clear-cut and admit no direct representation to Africans at all. 'The thin ends of wedges constantly hover before South African eyes,' as Dr Malherbe has said. But this position cannot easily be maintained in the face of world opinion, nor is it easy to reconcile with the profession of Christianity. There is therefore a plan to alter the whole basis of South African society and engineer something entirely new.

Many South Africans speak of *apartheid* without being very clear as to its exact meaning. But there is a plan, for which the spokesman is the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs. This body, located in the Afrikaans-speaking University of Stellenbosch, has as its first aim: ' To promote . . . the separate development of . . . the European and . . . the various non-European groups . . . and to protect the interests of these groups. . . .' SABRA is not to be confused with SAIRR, the South African Institute of Race Relations, which advocates a policy of cultural assimilation and considers total segregation impracticable. SABRA is the fountain of doctrine on the plan for racial separation. The plan has been outlined in the rough and made over to a Commission

appointed by the Government, who are instructed to consider in detail the practical implications.

Details will not be available until the Commission has reported; they were expected to report about the end of 1953. Nor is it clear how much of their outline plan the Government really expect to implement. But the broad outlines are published and represent an ideal which the Government regard as desirable. It is proposed to enlarge the existing Native reserves, to which it is hoped that eventually the British High Commission Territories will be added. When all the land earmarked for acquisition at the beginning of 1936 is available, the total area reserved for Africans will amount to seventeen and a half million morgen, or about 12.4 per cent of the surface of the Union. But a good deal of the Union is mountain and desert, and in value, say the Commission, this 12.4 per cent is nearly 25 per cent; if the British High Commission Territories are added, the proportion, they say, will be approximately 45 per cent. These areas, which will in future be referred to as Native States, will eventually comprise towns, factories and mines which are to be constructed deliberately with the object of satisfying the ambition of the educated African. Here Africans will eventually own the newly devised undertakings and here they, and they only, will have the right to vote and to own land. Here the European will be disfranchised and forbidden to hold property, just as the African is at present in the Union. And in Union territory the process of separation will be made more complete even than at present. Those Africans who come to the Union territory will not be allowed to settle but will come merely as migrant labour for a temporary purpose. As soon as the contract of employment is finished they will return to the Native State.

It is possible to distinguish two parts to this programme.

Let us first consider only that part of the proposal which deals with the creation of Native States and look secondly at its extension, the intensification of segregation within the Union. The first creates vertical barriers between races within a state, a device for which I can think of no exact parallel in history; the second seeks to strengthen horizontal bars already in existence.

To an Englishman, accustomed to proceed on empirical lines, the creation of Native States has the air of an attempt to reverse a natural process of evolution. It is a fact that this bold project holds up immediate improvements which might be made in, for example, housing. An African slum which might now be in process of being gradually rebuilt will be earmarked to become some day a white area or an Indian area and nothing permanent can be built there. A good example of this is Cato Manor in Durban; Sophiatown in Johannesburg is another; while Langa at Cape Town, now African, is one day to be Coloured and expensive new hostels for migrant labour will have to be converted to flats. The proposal of the Anglo-American Corporation to build good married accommodation for 10 per cent of their African employees at Welkom in the Orange Free State was first refused, and eventually granted for 3 per cent instead of 10—because it would mean a permanent settlement of African labour. Again, there is the question of how the electorate are to be induced to pay the large sums that will be needed for this project, which will certainly run to more, and perhaps much more, than £100,000,000. There are criticisms from the Nationalist ranks of the budget for 1953–4 as extravagant and this makes no provision for the project of the Native States. It may be, however, that the National Government are now so secure that they will be able to carry through a measure of this kind; they themselves argue that other

nations have spent in proportion more than this to avoid conquest by a foreign power and that their struggle is just as real.

More fundamental perhaps is the question of whether, when such States are established, they will provide a solution acceptable to Africans. There are of course many other considerations; the reserves, looked at purely as agricultural land, are already overpopulated, overstocked and eroded, while for industrial development they are badly sited. It is not yet clear what will be the relations of the Native States to the Union Government and whether they will be permitted to enter into economic competition or to control their own defence. There is no clear pronouncement on these points, but they are vital.

There are then obviously great practical difficulties about the first part of the scheme. It is defended on moral grounds as the only fair solution, and certainly it is a recognition of a change in theory. There was a time when the great majority of the Afrikaans-speaking people would have upheld the article of the old Transvaal Constitution which denied equality as between black and white in either Church or State. Today however the conscious belief of those working on this plan is that the Bantu is not potentially inferior to the European. What is difficult to assess is how many South Africans believe the plan can and will be put into effect, for how many it is a salve to the conscience, and for how many—one may guess very few—it is a cloak consciously adopted for the policy of the strong arm.

The second part of the programme however is actually being given effect and causes grave misgivings in African minds as to the good intentions of the first part. Within the Union, the Bantu will not only be denied the franchise and the right to own property, which are reciprocally denied to the European in the Native States, but

he is also to be segregated more rigidly than at present in public buildings and public transport. This is social segregation, which can hardly have either a political or an economic purpose. There are no countries in the world where there is one entrance to a railway station for skilled workers and another for unskilled. Lavatories are nowhere reserved for trade unionists only nor hotels for Tories. It is not a matter only of difference in culture. An African may be a skilled physician or a learned divine but to most white South Africans it will still seem wrong to share a railway carriage or a lunch-table with him. Ask why, and the answer will not concern votes or wages but ' the purity of the race '. The assumptions on which social segregation is based are that social equality must necessarily lead to miscegenation and that miscegenation is something to be regarded with aversion. For the second of these propositions we have already been unable to find good grounds; why it is held must therefore be the next subject of inquiry. And the first proposition also requires explanation.

XII

THE AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW

But before coming to these two propositions it will be of value to pause and to consider how the two proposals linked together under the general name of *apartheid* must seem from the point of view of the African and also how they appear to the Dutch Churches.

There are in the first place many Africans, not only in the Union but throughout Africa, who feel that some injustice has been done them over land. In a primitive community, land is seldom regarded as a subject for sale or barter. The right to use land is something anyone can understand, but the idea of owning or selling land in the sense in which a table is sold is hardly more than a metaphor; it is the right to use it which is sold, and even that is restricted. To sell land absolutely is either incomprehensible or is ' burdened with a perfect load of ceremony of which not one iota can be safely neglected.' A treaty made with a chief in return for a bottle of gin can seldom be regarded by the tribe as any substitute for this ceremony. The argument that the European was there before the Bantu does not apply east of the Fish River or in much of the territory north of the Orange River, and in any case ignores the Bushman and the Hottentot.

To an emotional feeling that he has been dispossessed must be added the African's resentment at the impact of the administration in South Africa. The laws which enforce the carrying of passes in the Union are complicated and numerous; they must be produced on demand and inability to produce them is an offence; there

are many areas in which the police have the right of entry into any African home to check the amount of beer and the number of persons on the premises. The number of Africans convicted of offences in 1952 was 868,007, while the total population of Africans in the Union is about eight million, of whom three and a quarter million live in the reserves, two and a half million on farms and one and a half million, rather more than 21 per cent of the total, in urban areas. Of those who come to urban areas—one may deduce from these figures—probably one in three is in the hands of the police at some time during every year.

Next come wages. The wages of unskilled African labour in the building trade are about one-sixth of the wages of the skilled European labour. Africans were until recently prevented from learning these skills, but are now permitted to do skilled work for African housing only. This trade is one example; there are many others in which the wages of unskilled labour are about one-sixth of those of skilled labour, while artificial barriers in many cases prevent the African from learning the skill.

These facts must be considered together with the reduction in political rights which has taken place since the Act of Union in 1910. Universal suffrage was instituted for Europeans in the thirties, at least doubling the European vote, but for the Coloured and for Africans the franchise remained as before, virtually limited to adult literate males with a property qualification, in the Cape Province only. In 1936, Africans in the Cape were taken off the common roll; Africans in the Cape elect three white members to the Assembly.

Cape Town is the only City or Town Council on which non-Europeans are directly represented. Everywhere it is the custom to maintain two sets of municipal accounts, so that the lowest income groups shall as nearly as

possible pay for their own services—road surfaces, drainage or lighting, Johannesburg being an exception in that the City Council does contribute on a considerable scale to the Native accounts. An estimate for 1946 is that throughout the Union £37,000,000 was spent on European Urban Areas and on Native Urban Area £1,800,000 (Marquard). Unpaved and unlighted streets, pitted with holes; latrines shared by a dozen families, providing not even privacy; one-roomed shacks of beaten-out kerosine tins which house a family, sometimes two; these are the signs of what it is to have no vote and these anyone can see in Langa, Cato Manor, or Sophiatown.

It is against this physical background that the newcomer from the tribal areas must often adjust himself to the individual and competitive world of the town. If it is not this, it is the mine compound, which is clean, sanitary and impersonal; here he is well housed, well clothed, and well fed, but he answers to a number and his name is forgotten. He is alone among men; he is young and may be newly married; it is not surprising if sometimes he falls into homosexual practices. He stays eighteen months perhaps and goes home for six, which gives his lungs a chance against silicosis. When he comes back to the mines, he comes of his own will to repeat the experience, but often a man does not really settle down to live with his wife till his working life is over. The mine-boy who spends all his life as a mine-boy, however, is to some extent insulated from the full force of the competitive world; if he leaves the mines for secondary industry, he has to face the re-orientation of all his ideas, social, economic, and religious. He cannot, of course, wholly escape the impact anywhere; even in the reserves the new world is pressing on him all the time, but the pressure is most insistent in the towns and for the man in

secondary industry. The example, highly condensed, of the changing values in one institution must serve to illustrate what he has to face.

In the traditional social structure, marriage customs were widely different between different tribes, but among all the southern Bantu it was possible to say that marriage was an alliance between groups, embodied in a treaty of which one of the first terms was to settle to which group the children should belong. Children were an asset because they strengthened the clan; wives were an asset because they could hoe and bear children; wives were capital and labour force in one. To have many wives and children was success. Among the patrilineal tribes—the majority in the Union—one group contracted to supply another with the labour and reproductive powers of a woman; if the first woman supplied was not fertile, a clause in the contract might provide that she would be replaced. The contract was cemented by the transfer of cattle, which were provided by the elders of the bridegroom's group and which must be returned if the contract fell through. The typical homestead would consist of a man and his wives, with his sons and their wives, living together in a highly complex and very tightly woven social structure. Stability was the object and on the whole it was achieved, with no doubt much contentment, happiness, and affection.

But in the new world, practically every aspect of marriage is changed. The Christian view of marriage, not legally forced upon the African but presented to him as part of the new world, is not of an alliance between groups but of a union between two individuals, lifelong and indissoluble, sealed by a promise to be faithful to each other—a strange and at first sight a tenuous bond compared with the cattle of the *lobola*. Here it is the young man who earns money, not the elders who control

the cattle; the young man is perhaps sending money to his father instead of waiting till his father finds the cattle for his marriage; he is likely to arrange his own marital affairs. Here ' a family ' does not mean the ' extended family ' or clan but two people and their children. Here a woman and her children are more often an expense than an asset. It is not surprising that in the complete reversal of values, many unions take place without legal formality at all, that marriages break up, that children are left without either parents or the traditional protection of the tribal elders.

There is much more that could be said, of the effects of loneliness and of unaccustomed authority on the women in the reserves, of the effects on the man of loneliness at the mines. It is in itself the subject for a volume, but it is only a part of the whole transition from the static clan system, in which the individual has his place assigned to him, and the open society in which he must fend for himself. It is not surprising that these conditions have produced extreme lawlessness, taking the form of gang warfare between Africans, drunkenness, dagga smoking, prostitution.

No one in South Africa, of whatever shade of opinion, would say that the present condition of the urban Native is anything but distressing, whether considered from the point of view of housing and health, from the point of view of happiness or of moral welfare. There can be few who would not add that the urban or educated Native is bitter and suspicious.

XIII

THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCHES

All this is a matter of deep concern to all elements in the community and perhaps to no one more than to the Dutch Reformed Churches. ' There are few nations in the world in which one can find such a strong alliance and symbiosis of Church and people as one finds among the Afrikaners,' wrote Dr Visser 'T Hooft. Afrikaners are not content to argue the Native question on the basis of mere expediency or materialism. They are inclined to regard as a mere Machiavellian appeasement the suggestion that it would be as well to avoid alienating unnecessarily those non-Europeans who have acquired some property and a stake in the country. The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs argue that in the course of, say, two generations the African will catch up and be the equal of the European in civilization: and they go on: ' If equality of civilization exists, the denial of rights to the Native population will be nothing but oppression. . . . Apart from the question of whether such a policy could be followed for an indefinite period, this road can only lead to perpetual strife. . . . Moreover it will mean that the European group will . . . be compelled to take steps which may well be contrary to its Christian conscience.'

It was in this atmosphere that the Dutch Reformed Churches met at Bloemfontein in 1950 to consider the Native question. The Conference concluded that: ' the policy of eventual intermingling is rejected because it will lead to unnecessary clashes between the two races: will

dig the grave for the future of the white race, and will therefore be of a great disadvantage to Christian culture in Africa. Therefore this would be a bad influence on the healthy growth of the Bantu ' (translated and summarized version of the proceedings). They therefore considered a policy of total territorial segregation in Native States and the gradual exclusion of all Natives from Union territory, which would mean that the white population would have to provide all the labour for the mines, for domestic service and for the farms. This, they agreed, would call for a tremendous act of self-sacrifice on the part of all Europeans and was not inconsistent with Christian principles. But it soon became clear that the Government did not believe that the sacrifices involved in a separation so total as this could form part of a political programme which could be submitted to an electorate. Subsequently a Synod of the Dutch Reformed Churches met to consider the biblical justification for a modified form of segregation in Native States, from which migrant labour would emerge to work in Union territory. On this unanimity was not achieved and the statement submitted to the Synod was set aside for further study.

Since then, it has been decided to hold a joint meeting of the majority of the Christian Churches in South Africa to discuss the question further. Most members of the Dutch Reformed Churches are still opposed to any form of integration, but it is clear that opinion is neither unanimous nor immovable. ' The Dutch Reformed Churches are aware,' the chairman of the steering committee for the coming conference is reported to have said, ' that there are great divergences of points of view, even among themselves, as well as with most English Churches. . . . '

XIV

THE REASONS FOR IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR

It is clear from what has been said about the Dutch Reformed Church that the conscience of the nation is far from easy on the subject of relations with the Native. Most South Africans are sensitive to the opinions expressed in Great Britain, in America and in the United Nations and must be thought of as a prey to the nagging not only of an external but of an internal critic. Faced with a situation obviously dangerous, the white South African has produced a plan to meet the danger, but with his rational and considered reaction goes behaviour which is not in accordance with his economic interest and does not seem to be dictated by political motives. Even if Africans are now assumed to be irreconcilably hostile—which until quite recently they were not—it would still have been possible to retain as allies both the Coloured people and the Indians. The Coloured traditionally were disliked by Africans and were anxious to assimilate themselves to European customs and standards. Yet in the last five years they have been alienated by the attempt to separate them from the common roll. It is true that since most of the Coloured voted for the United Party, the attempt can be defended on rational lines as a party measure, but surely on any long-term view it must be held contrary to the interests of the white minority. Indians, too, might be supposed to have misgivings as to their future among an African majority, yet the Group Areas Act threatens some of them with ruin and affects the interest and pride of almost all. They are forced into

a common non-European front. The whites then, who might with a little tact have altered the proportions so that with their allies they were four million to eight million Africans, have actually altered the proportions so that the Africans with their allies are nearly ten million to not much more than two million whites. It is true that much is being done for the Coloured people, by way of, for instance, Coloured camps. But such activities, conceived in the paternal spirit of doing something for others, cannot atone for the basic rejection involved in the doctrine of segregation. Nor can any promises of Native States reconcile the African to a regime founded on a policy of repudiation. If it is impossible to regard Africans simply as fellow human beings, it would be rational to appease them by a series of concessions; it would also be rational, if morally indefensible, to depress them in every way with the object of keeping them as long as possible in a servile state. But it does surely argue a mixed set of values to alienate a people by segregation and at the same time spend money on educating them. To an outside observer, the policy of social segregation would seem calculated to produce exactly that crisis in relationships which a minority would wish to avoid and of which this minority is clearly afraid. Why then do white South Africans proceed on so dangerous a path, ignoring their own clear interests?

A picture must be drawn of an Afrikaner farmer who is naturally a strong and dominant character, surrounded by people who defer to him and whom he looks after, to whom he is still in a parental or feudal relationship. The African farm labourer's employment is still governed by a contract, usually from harvest to harvest, which it is an offence for him to break; often he works so many days a year in return for the right to cultivate land and keep a specified number of stock; the relation-

ship in the *platteland* in short is still feudal and semi-permanent.

But why should this masterful parent, the settler, in Madagascar as well as in South Africa and the Southern States, so often ask the question: ' Would you like your daughter to marry a black man? ' The question implies that the girl will want to marry the black man as much as the reverse; it seems, to anyone brought up in Europe, at first surprising that this should seem so real a danger. But there can be no doubt that there is a real sex attraction across the racial barrier. It is a subject on which it is not easy to collect definite evidence, but both in the Southern States of America and in South Africa it is clear that between white men and black women the attraction is not only present but is sometimes gratified. No doubt, for one who gratifies his passions in this way there are many who do not but who are none the less subject to the desire, sometimes without being aware of it. No doubt there are others, too, for whom it does not even exist. It is felt, however—even in Madagascar and still more strongly where the Calvinist conscience is at work—to be an impulse to be ashamed of.

In the Southern States of America it was until fairly recently regarded as pardonable that there should be illicit relations between the white man and the black woman so long as it was kept quiet. What was unpardonable was that such a liaison should be legalized or even made public, and what was not mentioned was even the possibility of the reverse relationship. In South Africa, although on the farms it was at one time apparently by no means uncommon for young white men to have their first sexual experiences with Coloured or African girls, there was an even greater degree of reticence on the whole subject. Shame was felt, partly because St Paul strongly imbued the Bible-reading Protestant with a

feeling that there is something wrong about sexual desire in itself, and, secondly and more strongly, because, where there is so wide a cultural gap, a liaison which crosses the racial barrier is likely to be based on nothing but a physical impulse with no hint of any marriage of minds. And yet the very fact that such a union as this is wholly animal, and therefore doubly a matter for shame, makes it for some the more tempting, because no mental effort is involved, no respect need be shown, self-restraint and consideration may be forgotten and, finally, because afterwards the episode may be put completely out of mind and need not intrude itself into the rest of life. And a sadistic impulse is gratified by having one's will of a person who for social reasons cannot resist.

It would be absurd to suppose that such feelings as this are confined to South Africa. In England in the nineteenth century a phenomenon somewhat similar but without the racial aspect was to be observed between classes. Here too the Protestant conscience was in evidence and an attraction was felt for people of a lower class towards whom a greatly reduced courtesy and consideration need be shown. The tradition of the squire and the dairymaid runs through the literature of the century from *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* at one end of the literary scale to *Maria Marten or the Murder in the Red Barn* at the other. A recent South African novel, Alan Paton's *Too Late the Phalarope*, which has appeared since these pages were first drafted, illustrates the point admirably.

In the Southern States of America the situation was until recently similar, although here there was one feature of the psychological situation hardly present in South Africa. The Southerner, perhaps because of his knowledge of Negro girls, tended to place the white women of his acquaintance on a pinnacle of saintly

virtue and to deny them human attributes. It was this idealization of the white woman which was partly responsible for the pathological fury aroused among white males in the Southern States by any suggestion of familiarity to a white woman by a Negro. Dollard suggests that this is partly the result of thinking of a Negro as in his proper place when he accepts a dependent relationship similar to the filial relationship, a frame of mind which results easily in the second thought that while the white man is the father of the Negro, the white woman is a mother and that any familiarity on his part is incestuous.

But the question is never asked in the form: ' Do you want your son to marry a black girl? ' It is always put the other way round; partly no doubt because it is felt to be more shocking that way and therefore more difficult to answer but also for a deeper reason. The large element in the community who have never themselves in act crossed the lines of race and sex may be aware only of repulsion, but many—one may suspect—have experienced in some degree the impulse and unconsciously attribute to others the urge they have themselves resisted. This projection accounts for the belief, general among Europeans, that Africans are more highly sexed than themselves and almost universally desire white women. The Native acts as a scapegoat and is thought guilty of an offence which his accuser is hardly aware that he is himself tempted to commit. In India, incidentally, while Europeans regarded Indians as oversexed, Indians had exactly the same impression of Europeans. This repressed desire too accounts for the hostility felt at the mention of miscegenation. The ego requires all the reinforcements it can muster to repel the enemy as soon as it raises its head; everyone is aware of the tendency to punish with

special rigour offences to which a strong urge is felt. Lear said in his madness:

> Thou rascal beadle! Hold thy bloody hand!
> Why dost thou lash that whore? Strip thine own back.
> Thou hotly lusts to use her in that kind
> For which thou whip'st her.

And in all this tangle of factors, one more must be noted. The detribalized African of the towns is undoubtedly far more free than a European to slip into and out of sexual liaisons; some envy for a licence consciously repudiated is often felt unconsciously by Europeans, both men and women, perhaps more strongly by women who are more circumscribed than men. But it may be because fear, rather than envy, is stronger with them than in men.

Not everyone will be convinced either that these motives dictate the kind of behaviour which puzzles those who are not South African or that all the motives I have outlined are at work, but it will be agreed by most that there is sexual attraction across the race barrier and that the fact of this attraction is accompanied by a sense of guilt. This need not be personal guilt but may be felt on behalf of the community.

Such feelings as these would account for the desire of a people whose conscience is active to keep the ' Native ' at more than arm's length and to insist not only on a political segregation—which would meet their rational fears of political domination in a rational way—but also on social segregation in the form which would seem best calculated to undo any chance political segregation might have of a happy ending.

There is another factor, partially distinguishable. Because of the fear the situation provokes in him, because of the dislike he feels for a criticism from outside which to him seems based on ignorance of facts but on moral presumptions he cannot deny, the white South African

wishes desperately to rid himself of the whole question. Continued discussion of it, an Afrikaner Nationalist told me, produced in him a physical desire to vomit. Therefore the attempt is made—in a land where meals are cooked and served by African servants, where the streets are full of Africans—to forget Africans, to hide them, by providing separate benches in the parks, separate entrances to railway stations.

XV

THE ENGLISH ATTITUDE

The attitude of the English-speaking element in South Africa has to be considered in the light of a fundamental confusion in South African politics. There is a division among the white voters as to the treatment of the non-European and there is also a division between those who retain a loyalty to the British Crown or the Commonwealth or both and those who do not, but the divisions do not coincide either with each other or with the linguistic division. There is a hard core of Afrikaners who are Nationalists and whose views on the Native question are extreme but there are also Afrikaners who are far from liberal yet wish to continue the Commonwealth connexion; there are Englishmen whose views on the Native question induce them to vote Nationalist although they do not wish to leave the Commonwealth. There are both English and Afrikaner liberals. As usual, then, there are exceptions to all generalizations.

English-speaking people are mainly congregated in the towns and are strong in Durban and the neighbourhood, in Johannesburg and in Cape Town. There are fewer who have been exposed to the isolation of the *platteland* farms and in any case there is the overseas connexion which the Afrikaner hardly retains; English thought has thus been less parochial than Afrikaner. But an exclusive attitude is infectious and the English who have been any time in South Africa have caught something of the Afrikaner's outlook; the difference is mainly one of degree. Obviously, the feeling of injustice

at English hands is absent and the memories of battles with Africans are less strongly a feature of the English memory. The sexual element cannot be wholly absent but it is less strong, probably because the English have lived much more in towns and have therefore seldom been in a position in which they saw only black women. Further, the religious atmosphere has usually been different and the conscience less troublesome; it is rarely that the Calvinist element has been present and there has always been an element of the English population whose religion is by no means a marked feature of their lives. Those who are practising Christians usually belong to churches which have declared against *apartheid* as a principle but do frequently have separate services as a matter of convenience—an attitude which to the Afrikaner seems hypocrisy.

It would be fair to say that there is among the English less display of irrational feeling as to Africans and a greater readiness to be diplomatic. Few Englishmen, for example, would have introduced the legislation disfranchising the Coloured people. But there remains an absence of readiness to mix socially with people of other races—which is partly laziness—or to make political concessions—which is mainly fear. On the other hand, no one could say that the English attitude to Indians in Natal was rational. In the city of Durban, where the English are strongest, Africans, Indians and Europeans are in almost equal numbers and English feeling is considerably more acute against the Indian than against the Zulus who form most of the Native population. There is still a tendency to idealize the Zulu as the 'Native who knows his place', a cheerful extrovert and a good fighting man. But the Indians in Natal refuse to fit into their place in such a scheme as the Natal Englishman would like. The Indian is an economic rival with a low

standard of living, and no one can seriously claim that he is less intelligent or less civilized than the Englishman.

In general, the greater number of Englishmen throughout the Union would agree with the Nationalists that the cultural gap between European and Bantu is so great that social separation is essential, but they would avoid unnecessary pinpricks, administer the Acts leniently and encourage European immigrants. Few, however, could call this a constructive policy and the Nationalist is right when he says it is ultimately defeatist. In industry, upper class English-speaking people would favour greater opportunities for the African. The trade unionists, mostly English, have in the past been the main obstacles to the advance of the African in skilled trades but there have lately been signs of a more liberal attitude in the South African Labour Party. It is, however, a weak party backed by a few trade unions, and commanding only five seats in the House of Assembly.

XVI

INDIANS AND COLOURED

The majority of the Indians in the Union are the descendants of coolies who were brought into Natal at the invitation of the settlers to work their sugar farms. The Government of India showed little enthusiasm for the project and indeed made a number of conditions. One of these was that if immigrants on the conclusion of their indenture wished and were permitted to stay they should be given grants of land and should be treated as citizens of the country without discrimination. The grants of land were often not made; soon after 1893 Indians were removed from the Common Roll of voters on the grounds that had they been in their own country they would not have enjoyed the vote, but the vote was not restored when it was granted in India. Indians are not represented in the House of Assembly of the Union, they have no vote in Municipal elections and are not represented on the Municipal Councils throughout the Union. Social segregation is strict. It is with a sense of astonishment that a visitor realizes that educated Indians, who may be graduates of universities and enjoy good incomes in business or professions, may not go to a cinema which is open to Europeans and that in the cinemas open to them the films are limited to those considered suitable for non-Europeans.

Perhaps the greatest threat to Indians at present is the Group Areas Act. A number of the community are small shop-keepers and their shops are scattered throughout the population; to put them together in one area would

destroy their livelihood. Apart from this, it has long been a fact that the areas in which Indians can purchase property is limited; the price of land in such areas has therefore been much higher than in areas open to Europeans. In the new plans, under the Group Areas Act, it frequently happens that an area in which an Indian has bought land is now declared a White or a Coloured area and what he bought on a restricted market at an extravagant price must be sold on a market artificially flooded. The Group Areas Act is so drafted that it may be harshly or sympathetically administered, and the full rigour permitted by the Act has not yet been enforced; it remains however a perpetual threat.

The position of the Cape Coloured is in some ways similar to that of the Indian but not so many of them have been able to acquire wealth and education. They are a people without a culture of their own; most of them speak Afrikaans as their mother tongue. They thus resemble the Negroes of the United States more than the Bantu of South Africa. Their great handicap is the fact that nearly all their educated leaders are school teachers in government schools. It is not easy for people in such a position to take an active part in politics and criticize the Government.

Both the Indian and the Cape Coloured have traditionally been disliked by the African and have been frightened of him. Lately there has been a tendency for the Indian in particular to join forces with the African in a common front against the European; there are fewer signs of such a move by the Coloured.

At the University of Witwatersrand, Professor MacCrone's researches indicate that most South Africans, whether Afrikaans or English-speaking, will place the Coloured people lower in their scale of tolerance than the Native. There can only be two reasons for this, first that

the Coloured is regarded as more of a threat to the economic position of the European, as something closer and therefore more of a competitor, and secondly, that the mere sight of the Coloured man is a reminder of the feelings of guilt which have been described in Chapter XIV. But it seems doubtful whether the same reaction would occur in the Cape Province or Natal.

XVII

A SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION IN THE UNION

The two most important elements in the South African racial situation are then the Afrikaner and the African. The Afrikaner has the majority among the white votes and he has the power today. The African has the numbers and to him the other excluded groups, Cape Coloured and Indian, must take second place. As to the English-speaking South African, he shares in some degree most of the Afrikaner's views but they are modified by wider contacts with the world and long political experience. Few Englishmen share the assumption that to pass a law is enough and that social development will then obediently conform; we are inclined to let law follow opinion.

With this proviso and a reminder that there is no such thing as a typical man, the motives behind the South African attitude to race may be set down. Fear must come first, but it is a fear that takes different forms. There is first a fear that democratic principles may lead to a black domination of the white which will reverse the present situation; it includes the fear of the white daily-paid labourer for his job. This is a conscious fear which can be rationally supported by sober statistics; it is however reinforced by motives not all of which are conscious. There are memories of Blood River and of Piet Retief; there are irritated memories of the equalitarian theories of English missionaries and the liberal principles of English statesmen, which fuse with recollections of the two wars with the English and the struggle for the

Afrikaner language. There are memories of patriarchal life on the farm and the relationship of a master with hands who are temporarily serfs and not far from slaves. It is a relationship in which affection and attraction as well as domineering and sometimes sadistic impulses come to the surface, while with these feelings go an anger and irritation at the ' Native ' who refuses to stay in the place mentally assigned to him. There is the sexual element, which may take one of the three forms already described, either jealousy of an imagined sexual freedom, or desire, which may on the one hand be imperfectly repressed or on the other may be projected on to the Native and often regarded as repulsion. This is an element which must be considered together with the feelings of guilt and fear which spring from the doctrine of predestination and from the consciousness that a sexual attraction in which there is no spiritual or mental element is animal and degrading. Apart from this, there is a widespread feeling of guilt because the present situation is not easy to reconcile with the teaching of the New Testament.

That is the white side; on the African side one perceives a people engaged in the painful transition from a society based on status to an open society in which contract and competition play a part. This for the individual involves transition from a psychological structure of dependence to one of competition, which is necessarily painful, even if the handling is extremely sympathetic; it is a transition which does often include a stage of atavistic revolt. And here too, as on the white side, one may perceive both attraction and repulsion, an attraction to the new culture and all that goes with it, an admiration, sometimes unwilling, for the European's skills, together with an anger at what seems his arrogance and injustice and some questioning of his standards of value.

There are two other powerful forces at work; the searching of heart in the Dutch Reformed Churches and the effects of an expanding industrial system. There are not enough white workers to do what is needed and the industrial colour bar is cracking as the African slips here and there, almost unnoticed, into skilled work. Today 82 per cent of the workers in South African commerce, industry, agriculture, fisheries and mining are non-European, while 67 per cent of the semi-skilled labour and 16 per cent of the skilled labour in industry is non-European. It would be cynical to suppose that it is entirely in recognition of this fact that the Labour Party is becoming more liberal. At the same time, most large-scale employers would like to see the industrial colour bar broken, partly from immediate self-interest but also because they believe that in the long run concessions to Africans are necessary in the interests of industrial peace. These are forces working for the disintegration of the existing stabilizing device of horizontal barriers; they are however at present less strong than *platteland* nationalism which aims at strengthening the horizontal barriers and adding vertical barriers as well. Nor can their operation keep pace with the mounting strength of African resentment.

In attempting to analyse the causes of tension, one factor we put in the list was a liberal or a non-liberal tradition in the dominant race; in South Africa, we have seen the two striving for mastery. In the nineteenth century, Shepstone expressed, as we have seen, the view that ultimately the African would be the European's equal; this implied that the gap was cultural, not social, and the old liberal Cape policy aimed at smoothing the way to eventual equality by ' colour-blind ' legislation in which as far as possible discrimination was cultural only. The opposed view was, in the nineteenth century, quite simply that the difference was racial and permanent and

should be recognized in law. But in the twentieth century both views have been modified. On the English side, as both economic and political dangers have come nearer, the economic interest of special classes has been given more weight than theory and liberalism has been tacitly abandoned to a handful of idealists. On the Afrikaner side, Shepstone's doctrine is now officially accepted, but the application once given it by the Cape liberals is uncompromisingly rejected; the possibility of eventual equality is now seen as an argument not for keeping the barriers as few as possible but for strengthening and increasing them. In the outcome, then, the difference between the two points of view has resolved itself; there is no difference of principle left, only a divergence of method. Of the two main parties, one is prepared to be more tactful than the other. That at least was the most one could say until the spring of 1953. Since its defeat in the April elections, the United Party has rid itself of some of its right-wing elements and has shown signs of adopting a more positive policy.

XVIII

A COMPARISON WITH KENYA

In South Africa we have attempted to analyse the motives at work in the country where racial tension seems at present to be most acute; it seems likely that motives which are visible here will also be present elsewhere though perhaps in a modified form and though they may not be so easy to detect. Before considering whether the analysis provides any answers to the questions asked at the beginning of this essay, it would be preferable to attempt a similar analysis of at least one other society, but in a paper of this length that is hardly possible. Some comparison must however be made, and for this Brazil—at the opposite extreme—is at first sight tempting. But Brazil is too remote in feeling; sentiment is so different from the *plattelander's* Calvinism that a superficial comparison would have little value; let us come instead closer home and compare South African attitudes with those in Kenya.

Here there are three factors which differ from South Africa. In the dominant race, the tradition is liberal and democratic, while the numerical proportions differ and there is also the basic difference that there is virtually no European daily-paid labour. These changes have the effect that we should expect of making the stabilizing device less rigid than in South Africa. The builders, the garage mechanics, the craftsmen, like many of the traders, both wholesale and retail, are Indian and it is the Indian, not the white trade unionist, who stands immediately in the African's way. This has not, however, produced

any very sharp hostility between them. Here, more markedly than in Durban and certainly with more marked success than in Durban, the Indian has made overtures to the African, on the grounds that both are excluded from power and social equality. If the Indian craftsman has not yet shown much readiness to pass on his skills to the African, there are at least no legal barriers in the way. The gap between African and Indian wages and ways of life is less than between African and English and the conflict is not direct but lies within a triangle of forces; the Indian, though greatly distrusted by many of the English, is a much less irritating factor in the general situation than white daily-paid labour and may come to act as a social bridge. There are among them not only people with charming manners and sophisticated minds but also with a great deal of political wisdom.

As to the English attitude, it is true that both Africans and Indians alike are at present excluded from hotels and there are not many social fields in which the three races meet; there is however apparent in the English attitude something more than the difference noticed between the English and the Afrikaners in the Union. It is possible to stand for election on a platform of better treatment for the African and, without winning a seat, at least obtain a substantial number of votes, while, more significant still, the leaders of the European politicians and the Government are more liberal in their attitude than the majority of the electors. This represents the difference between an ideal consciously professed but not lived up to and an ideal that is repudiated.

In the Union, the Fagan Commission recommended that the convention that all Africans have homes in the reserves should be abandoned as a fiction, that the existence of the urban African should be accepted as a fact;

the Union Government and its people have instead intensified their efforts to restrict the movement of Africans from the Reserves. They restrict the attempts of the Johannesburg City Council to provide the fifty thousand African homes of which they are short, they restrict the efforts of the Anglo-American Corporation to build married accommodation at Welkom in the Orange Free State. The professed ideal of segregation is continually at war both with the obvious needs of the situation and with the altruistic ideals which are a real part of the Afrikaner character. On the other hand, in Nairobi, where ten thousand African homes are needed, the facts are recognized and there is an agreed programme which has been financed and which will provide the houses within seven years.[1] Union spokesmen say that their Government spends more on education than any British colony; this is true, considered per head of population, but not as a percentage of revenue. Kenya in 1946 spent 8.6 per cent of her £5,650,000 budget on native education; in 1953 she had budgeted for spending 14.3 per cent of a £15,000,000 budget. The revenue of the Union in 1946–7 was £139,000,000, of which less than 3 per cent was spent on native education; in 1952–3, the Union spent £7,853,000 from a budget of £182,835,000, or 4.3 per cent on Native education.

Politically, too, there is a difference; the Union's eight million Bantu are represented by three Europeans in the Lower House and four Europeans in the Upper House. No African may sit in the Parliament. In Kenya, the representatives of the white electorate sit with Indians, Arabs and Africans, partly elected and partly nominated, the total of non-Europeans being between a third and a

[1] Since this was written it has been announced that Nairobi City Council has speeded up its £2 million programme for African housing; '. . . by December 1954 it hopes to have provided adequate housing for all Africans who are now without it' (*The Times*, 7 September 1953).

half of the whole. A greater trust in Africans is also to be seen in small ways; taxi-drivers for instance are African and Africans are enlisted in the armed forces. Socially, the Union Government enforces separation wherever possible and believes it should be extended; in Kenya the efforts of the Government and unofficial leaders are aimed at gradually removing barriers. A symbol which illustrates the different attitude admirably is the United Kenya Club; founded by the late Governor for all races, the club is used mainly by Indians with a few Africans and Europeans; it has the vague good will and the subscriptions of many more Europeans, but social laziness is everywhere an English vice and many who subscribe do not go there.

It would be absurd to suggest that race relations in Kenya are anything but strained; the fundamental problem of how they are to live with their millions of Africans is as urgent a problem to Kenya's thirty thousand Europeans as to South Africa's two million and a half. But in Kenya there is one European to a hundred Africans and in South Africa it is one to three and the different proportions tend to make the European—taken individually and in his soberer moments—less intransigent; references to the old guard who see the future only in terms of white mastery are usually made with a smile. This numerical proportion may however affect the African's outlook too, and in the reverse direction; it is easier to think of 30,000 people going away than of two and a half million.

As to the present emergency, it is significant that it has arisen among the tribe most clearly in transition from status to a competitive open society; one may expect—on the analogy of similar outbreaks elsewhere—that it will appear to die down as suddenly as it began and that most of the tribe will become suddenly anxious to return to a

state of dependence. It will however be necessary to make sure that instead of this they continue as swiftly as may be in their progress towards an independent attitude in a world of contractual freedom—if possible much more swiftly than before. Not that the passage can be entirely smooth; this will not be the only adolescent trantrum. But it is possible to emerge from adolescence, even after tantrums, with a friendly regard for a parent or guardian. And on the whole there is less chance of such a result in a home where tantrums are not allowed.

XIX

THE COST OF A STABILIZING DEVICE

Looking back on the journey we have come, there are some questions we can answer with tolerable certainty. Men are held together in groups by a common interest or religion, by a common culture or language, by a common race or by a shared historical tradition. These groups, whether racial or otherwise, can live side by side in amity so long as the present order seems unlikely to change. But as soon as external pressure, internal decay, change elsewhere, or a declared philosophy of trusteeship and progress make it apparent that a shift of power may take place—then animosity is aroused and a struggle for power, overt or concealed, will begin. If the groups are racial, it cannot be said that the animosity will necessarily be any fiercer than it might be otherwise. Confederates thought quite as harshly of carpet-baggers as of their released slaves in 1870; one would hesitate to suggest that feeling is more acute between Afrikaner and Bantu than between Hindu and Muslim in India, or between Dubliner and Ulsterman.

But where race differences are visible and there is a hard and fast line dividing races, it will be harder to make exceptions, and injustice between races within a state is more glaring than anywhere else. This however is not the essence of the difference. Where there is a racial element in the clash between groups, there are to be found irrational elements in behaviour which do not occur where the difference is solely political or economic. One hears of no objection to the coffined remains of a

capitalist going to the cemetery in a hearse which has carried the coffined remains of a trade unionist—but this does occur between white and black in South Africa. No Confederate refuses to drink from a cup because it has once been sullied by a Yankee lip, but this kind of refusal does occur in South Africa and in India, where caste is believed to be a matter of ancestry.

Some fusion between the races is the most usual result of conquest. Where a hard and fast racial line has been maintained, it has been by some kind of social engineering, a stabilizing device intended to prevent fusion and keep change at bay. We have analysed the circumstances in which such devices are introduced and were able to enumerate the main factors; a slightly less superficial consideration of two societies has confirmed that analysis, since we found the device less rigid where two of the factors were absent. We have also been able to say with some certainty that neither biology nor what I have called statistical psychology can disclose any reason for holding that the performance of any individual was likely, because of his race, to be so poor as to justify on any rational grounds segregation in order to preserve racial purity. Nor did such a ground emerge from consideration of achievement or of analytical psychology. But we have not attempted to answer the question of what is the cost paid for a stabilizing device such as exists in South Africa and is slowly vanishing from the Southern States.

This is a question which can hardly be answered without making a moral judgment of the kind we have tried so long to postpone, and indeed by now it is clear that there is a point beyond which discussion is futile without some definition of values. On whatever level race is considered, assumptions of a moral nature are made and, unless they are stated, only confusion can result. We have

seen, for instance, that a business man may assume that civilization is ' better ' than a primitive society, that a doctor may assume that a contented and placid personality is ' better ' than one that is striving and competitive. And one begins to perceive that beyond a certain point only two kinds of discussion can be of value; one is philosophical and religious, the other is intensive and factual and proceeds on the basis of a stated—not an implicit—political and philosophical creed.

Take, for instance, the ideal of the Belgian administrator, who pictures to himself an African artisan, with an income sufficient for his needs, regular at the Mass, clever with his hands and employed in his leisure on improvements to the little house which he built and owns himself and where he lives with his wife and children. Such a man is happy and well fed, concerning himself very little with the progress of humanity, content to read a paper that approves of the government, content to go once a week to a cinema where he will see a film that is considered suitable, content to bring up children who, like himself, shall be well fed and comfortable.

It is in the light of this picture—and not of the Declaration of Rights or the settlement of 1688—that you must talk about race problems to a Belgian and ask his opinion of the value and cost of a stabilizing device. And it is clear at once that he regards a visible stabilizing device as something unlikely to produce what he wants. He goes to great pains to avoid the appearance of anything of the kind. He dislikes legal distinctions and hard and fast lines between groups, on no abstract grounds but because they produce discontent. So there is no industrial colour bar, no limit to the skills an African can attain, no vote in Africa for either Belgian or African, and the *évolué* has ' all the privileges of a Belgian '. The principle

is carried to great extremes; for example, the Union Minière deliberately makes its wage schedule so complicated that a man must go to a great deal of trouble to compare his wages with anyone else's.

That the Belgians are in fact operating a very subtle and flexible stabilizing device is apparent. But most members of the group in whose favour it works are for most of the time in Belgium and they have taken pains to avoid stabilization on racial lines between groups in the Congo. Therefore their device works—for the present, and they do not profess to look far into the future. For the present, their system does produce something not dissimilar from their ideal. It is a slight and almost invisible device for which, as yet, they pay a very low price.

The British colonial system is clearly based on a different standard of values. We may usefully compare methods with the Belgian and learn much, but we must bear in mind all the time the two standards of value, and it is in the light of these standards and of British and American historical development that we of the Anglo-Saxon world must consider what is paid for a stabilizing device and what exactly is bought. Probably a Southern slave owner would agree with Abraham Lincoln, and the most rigid conservative with the Fabian, that the society he desired was one in which the rule of law was observed and violence was the exception; all want to buy stability and tranquillity. But Englishmen made up their minds during the struggle between Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth century—and Americans reasserted the doctrine a hundred years later during the War of Independence—that tranquillity is something for which too high a price can be paid. The price is too high, and indeed we are really buying the wrong thing, if men are forced to obey a will which they do not recognize as in some way their own, if they cannot criticize the government, or if

an exceptional individual is kept in an obscure position because of the status with which he was born. We of the English-speaking world are committed to a way of life and a system of government which aims at permitting a man to search for unhappiness in his own way. However difficult it may be to achieve in practice a real equality of opportunity, to us there is something repugnant in putting legal obstacles in its way. We believe it is right and healthy that the government should be open to criticism, and we are bound by the foundation of our political beliefs to extend to another race such liberty as we have ourselves unless it can be shown that there are the strongest possible reasons against it.

We are committed on this point and it is no use pretending we are not. Once it is agreed that men of all races have potentialities of mental and spiritual development which do not differ quantitatively between races, any stabilizing device which imposes permanent horizontal barriers must—by our standards—be condemned. In itself it is too high a price to pay, quite apart from the consequences it brings with it. And these are formidable.

In the first place, it brings a loss of efficiency. Democracy is often criticized as inefficient but surely a heavy price must be paid in efficiency by any system which prevents an individual of ability from rising to a responsible post. Indeed, it is arguable that a people's success in art, science and literature as well as in war and politics seems to depend on the method of recruitment to the upper class, that being most efficient which recruits from the widest field and best combines the vigour that comes from competition with the breadth and impartiality that comes of an assured position. A stabilizing device limits the field of recruitment, reduces competition, and rules out impartiality. There will also be a perpetual watchfulness involved for the dominant race which is likely to

breed tension, irritability, and bitterness—all paradoxically combined with sloth. 'Our nation is so constituted,' wrote the Directors of the Dutch East India Company, 'that as soon as they have the convenience of slaves they become lazy and unwilling to put forth their hands to work.' Idleness of this kind is not confined to the Dutch; it is to be found wherever there is a subject race unless immense pains are taken to prevent it—as by the Spartans, who paid for their supremacy by the sacrifice of family life, material comfort, and artistic achievement. The sense of superiority breeds a feeling that it is undignified to take trouble, as may be seen if you contrast the casual manner of a European shopkeeper in Nairobi with an Indian's eagerness to sell.

There will be loss of skill, because skill is born of prentice drudgery. The device must depend on force and in the long run a dominant people brought up in such a system will come to admire force, which may easily tend to brutality and trickery—which is a frugal means of making a little force go a long way. On the dominated side, too, force will be admired and idleness, dependence, lack of foresight, drunkenness, and all other forms of living in the moment encouraged, apart from the obvious cost of humiliation and loss of opportunity.

On the economic level, a stabilizing device which keeps wages down reduces purchasing power and wealth, and secondary industry does not develop for lack of markets. The white trade unionist, whose immediate interest has helped to keep African wages down, is really making the mistake of the Luddites who smashed machines more than a century ago: he is reducing for selfish reasons the wealth of the community—and in the long run of his own class.

These are some of the costs of a stabilizing device based on horizontal barriers, barriers which purport to be per-

manent. But there can be little doubt that in the paternal stage barriers are needed and it may be that some barriers are necessary during the difficult period of transition from a static to a dynamic society; so long as it is understood that they are temporary, some of the dangers disappear. When Europeans first appeared in Africa, laws frankly discriminatory which prohibited Europeans from selling liquor to Africans or Africans selling land to Europeans could only do good. The danger, however, is that benevolent discrimination may cease to be benevolent. There are real dangers in even the most disinterested and temporary of stabilizing devices.

There is a postscript to this conclusion. The British and American view of politics is based on the implication that a full belly and contentment are not ultimately enough, that the risk, not only of unhappiness but of degradation, ought at some stage to be taken because the free development of an individual personality is the highest good. This is a corollary—or so it seems to us—of Christian doctrine. Throughout this essay as few assumptions as possible have been made, the object being the company of as many allies as can be kept for so long as possible. But there is another and quite different approach. In his book *South Africa*, first published in 1931 and recently republished, the late J. H. Hofmeyr writes: ' South Africa regards its task from the point of view of making South Africa safe for the white man. But perhaps it may be that to it there applies the supreme paradox of the New Testament: " Whosoever will save his life shall lose it, but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and for the Gospel's, the same shall save it . . . ." ' To those who believe that paradox and who believe that God loves the world and has made Himself manifest in the world that men might have life, it will seem possible to come to the conclusion we have reached by a firmer

and less tortuous path. But though this will seem transparent to most English Christians it will not be equally clear to all Belgians or Afrikaners. However firmly then we believe in these absolute values we cannot appeal to them in this context. Here, if we are to carry conviction, our reference must be to stated political tenets, the relative values of a political group.

Can these be stated for South Africa? The Nationalists too must be judged by their ideals as much as by their works, and on this plane they no longer believe that the Bantu race are permanently their inferiors. They do, however, make two assertions which must be regarded as fundamental to their case. These are that 'the European community will never permit the Native population to deprive the Europeans of their right of political determination'; and that 'as long as the European retains political control he will endeavour to prevent ... biological intermixing....' (SABRA: *Integration or Separate Development?*) They speak also of the right and duty of self-preservation. From this one may deduce that they believe that the difference between the races is not merely physical but that there is a qualitative difference of mind and character, divinely decreed and not solely the result of environment. They believe that this difference ought to be preserved, that it adds something to the world's rich diversity, that 'loss of identity' by either group is at all costs to be avoided. This is the philosophy implicit in SABRA's statement of policy, and it is in the light of this philosophy that the South African plan must be discussed if there is to be any common ground for the disputants.

Judged by this criterion, the discussion becomes primarily one of method. How can the South African object of preserving the identity of the white group best be attained? A factual discussion of the possibility of the

segregation plan must wait for the publication of the Tomlinson report. If the plan is possible, will it achieve the object desired? And do South Africans really mean to carry it out? These are questions worth asking. It is these or a discussion that is frankly philosophical and religious: there is nothing between the two and only confusion can result from mixing one with the other.

XX

WHAT CAN BE DONE

To a parent who asked how a child should be brought up to avoid the appalling dangers revealed to him, the psychologist Freud replied that there was no easy solution; the process was bound to be difficult and probably harmful and he could only suggest that it was on the whole better to embark on it with some knowledge than in ignorance.

Some such reply must be one's conclusion on the problem of racial tensions. Dr Myrdal, who speaks of the American aspect with an authority no one else can command, has recently attributed much of the improvement which has taken place in the last ten years to the work of American sociologists, who have made the facts so well known that to display racial prejudice has come to be the mark of an uneducated person. Economic circumstance has been on the side of the sociologists, but there can be no doubt that constant ventilation has had its effect.

In South Africa the problem is incomparably more difficult. The danger to the white elector is far more serious than anything that faces the Virginian or the Texan and yet at the same time he has to guide an already suspicious and resentful Bantu on his traverse across the slippery slopes that lie between a static and a competitive society. All that one can say with any confidence is that the traverse will have to be made somehow and that the more people there are in South Africa who have some idea of what it is they are trying to do and

some understanding of their own motives, the less certain it is that one need despair of the outcome. And to this they can certainly be helped by some knowledge of the same problems elsewhere; all the more is this true of Kenya and the Rhodesias.

The problem is a practical one. Tensions are increasing everywhere and world events are moving fast. There is no time for that leisurely evolution which might have brought the Bantu almost painlessly across the slopes; he will not wait to acquire generations of experience, nor will other people delay, if we do, to give him the benefit of their experience. But there is no quick or easy way to knowledge and it is only by knowledge, and by knowledge based on study, that any firm convictions can be reached. In spite of the urgency, plans for study must be made on the basis that thoroughness must come first and speed second.

The conclusion, then, to this first tentative exploration is that more knowledge, based on detailed study, may be helpful. And, while on many points it has been possible to reach only doubtful and guarded conclusions, we can be a good deal more certain about the method by which to proceed. What we have to study is the feeling between races in a given territory as manifested in action; it is something which changes with varying factors; it must be considered against the history of race feeling in that territory. After tracing the growth and change of hostility and friendship, repulsion and attraction, the study should proceed to an analysis of existing attitudes in the various elements of the population. This analysis should be displayed against the present political, social and economic background and should be supported by instances of feeling, displayed in action, and also, where possible by statistical information as to the views of as many people as possible, expressed in a numerical, and

therefore necessarily crude and over-simplified form, together with a limited number of more detailed case-histories of individuals, chosen after the compilation of statistical information. One object of the analysis should be to dissect out the racial element from other aspects in each attitude described and illustrated; a second should be to reveal elements in the tensions and antagonisms which can be cured, by government or perhaps even by industrial action.

The inquiry should be factual and intensive but should proceed on the basis of a stated political creed. This creed will vary with the territory studied, but it should be stated as clearly as may be and the various attitudes and actions displayed both in the light of the creed of that territory and also in the light of the writer's own creed.

There are many studies of minute parts of this problem and there is one comprehensive study of the American aspect. What is now needed is a series of territorial studies, each of the kind described above, of other territories, of Central Africa, the West Indies, East Africa, Malaya, Fiji, and the Belgian Congo; of French and Portuguese Africa, of Brazil, Mexico, Hawaii, Liberia, and British West Africa. From such a series there might emerge conclusions as to the nature of racial tensions which might carry conviction. It would also be possible, as each study was completed, to say with much greater certainty than at present what are the points at which there is most hope of meeting opposing views. Dr Myrdal, for instance, pointed out that in the Southern States the importance attached by the white man to various aspects of the separation of the races was in reverse order to the importance the Negro gave them. Each might thus be persuaded to concede the point which to him was least—and to the other most—signifi-

cant. This kind of result should emerge from each such study, and each should conclude with recommendations for action by a Government or an industry.

It is, surely, profoundly important for the future of the world that each group of races, the fair and the dark, should know what it is the other fears and what it is the other wants. At present, we are not always aware of what our own group wants, let alone the other side.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE ARGUMENT

I. THE NATURE OF RACE

There is an inconsistency between the profession and the practice of the Western group of powers which weakens their claim to champion individual liberty; there are peoples who because of this inconsistency will not join the West in their struggle against Communism. Does the protest against ' colonialism ' or ' imperialism ', that is the domination of one people by another, proceed on account of an inherent racial antagonism, or is it merely lent an edge by race? Groups of people are often bound together or divided by forces untrue or imaginary; is race such an imaginary bond or division? A tentative definition of race.

II. AREAS OF TENSION

The European expansion of the last five centuries; is the tension which has resulted due to differences of race or culture or to memories of slavery? The situation considered in various territories. The Russian inconsistency between practice and precept. The main problem however is in Africa and here the four principal colonial powers and the Union of South Africa have each a different approach. Where the kind of tension we are concerned with seems most acute, the fear that power may shift has produced a device intended to stabilize the existing position. What are the circumstances present in these territories and absent in others?

III. FACTORS WHICH ACCOMPANY TENSION

The type and climate of territory; the degree of civilization in the race dominated; the approach of the dominating race. We should expect to find tension most acute and the stabilizing device most rigid in a temperate climate, where Europeans settle and work for daily wages, where the dominated people are primitive and where the dominant people are Northern rather than Mediterranean in their approach; as among North Europeans, where the political philosophy is not liberal and democratic. There is a typical cycle of relationships now completed in the case of Europeans and Asians, in an early stage as between Africans and Europeans. From this analysis, we should expect to find the device most rigid in South Africa, followed by the Rhodesias and the United States, followed by Kenya.

IV. THE ANSWER OF BIOLOGY

Stabilizing devices are introduced to preserve the dominant position and genetic purity of the dominating race. This might be justifiable—and here a moral judgment would have to be made—if one race were shown to be biologically not the equal of the other. Biology, however, discloses no difference, which involves any necessary superiority of mind or character, either in the size or shape of the skull, the folds of the brain, the basal metabolic rate, the working of the endocrine glands, in the sense of taste, the proportion of the blood groups.

V. THE ANSWER OF STATISTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

There is a fundamental difficulty about applying the methods of physical science to the spirit of man because

there is an unpredictable element. The answer can never be that there is no difference, but only that none can be detected. Statistical psychology, and in particular intelligence tests, cannot reveal the whole truth about a mind and cannot wholly separate the effect of environment from heredity. But so far as it can go, this science returns the same report as biology.

VI. HISTORY, CLIMATE, DIET

But a practical man will ask why the African races south of the Sahara have made so little mark upon the world. The lack of stimulus from abroad was not complete and the environment surely presented some challenge but diet seems now universally deficient in protein and diseases of a wasting, debilitating nature have for centuries been widespread.

VII. AN ANSWER FROM ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

The theory that psychological differences between European and African are due to late weaning may be part of the truth but surely more important is the whole social background; the European, coming from a dynamic society, faces life in a competitive spirit, while the African fresh from a tribal society, which is essentially static, is dependent on the world around him and not competitive. The psychological structure is not composed of different elements but is put together differently. From this it appears that any work in the field must consider the individual against his social and historical background.

VIII. GENETIC MIXTURE

No hereditary inferiority has yet been disclosed which might be taken to ' justify ' denying opportunity on racial grounds; but there might be an argument for segregation of the races if racial mixture was likely to produce offspring inferior to the parents. No controlled experiments are possible, but the analogy of domestic animals indicates the likelihood of hybrid vigour, and, historically, mixed races display vigour and originality. But mixed children cannot often be expected to overcome a climate of opinion where they are regarded as inferior.

IX. THE REASONS FOR RACIAL FEELING

We have not found any valid reasons for race feeling and the imposition of stabilizing devices. It does not seem to be true that feeling arises solely from economic exploitation or from some inherent aversion or from the sense of smell. If there was only aversion, there would surely be no need for artificial barriers; some attraction too must be present. Fear in many different forms seems the main motive. But let us look at one society in more detail.

X. RACIAL ASPECTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

The anarchic tendency of early Dutch settlers; their Calvinism; the first divisions between Christian and pagan, free and slave, replaced by black and white. The settler's reaction to early British evangelical liberalism; the two standards of value, Boer and British. Boer memories of battles and irritation at British arrogance. The need for discriminatory legislation to protect the African,

and its dangers. Memories of the Anglo-Boer Wars and the struggle for the Afrikaans language; the present division of the electorate.

XI. THE SOUTH AFRICAN PLAN

The solution of total separation between the races as set out by its exponents; its practical difficulties. A distinction between the creation of Native States and the policy of more rigid segregation within the Union. The latter would not be needed if fears were merely political and economic and can only proceed from fear for the purity of the race. Why is this fear so acute?

XII. THE AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW

But first look at separation from the African point of view. He feels he has been unjustly deprived of land, that the administration is interfering, that wages for him are unfairly less than for Europeans, that he is unfairly treated over municipal services. Meanwhile he has to adjust himself to a new and dynamic society, in which all his old values are reversed.

XIII. THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCHES

The Dutch Reformed Churches cannot look at this problem from a selfish or cynical point of view and believe that there is biblical justification for *complete* separation; they are however less certain about segregation within the Union. If their concern was solely political, they could, surely, provide an outlet for ambition in the Native States and then gradually abandon social segre-

gation within the Union. But they cannot bring themselves to this and it must be because their fear is more than political.

XIV. THE REASONS FOR IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR

There does exist a sexual attraction across the race frontiers; this is felt to be degrading and is on the conscience of the people as a whole, even of those who are not themselves conscious of any attraction. It is this which causes the white South African to insist on a social segregation which seems likely to ruin any chance of success for political segregation.

XV. THE ENGLISH ATTITUDE

The difference between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking attitudes is comparative; they share many views. But on the whole, the English, for historical reasons, are less violent in their opinions and more tactful, less wholesale in their remedies and less concerned about the ultimate future.

XVI. INDIANS AND COLOURED

The white electorate's refusal to make allies of Coloured people or Indians is contrary to their own interests and must proceed from deeper motives.

XVII. A SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION IN THE UNION

This summarizes Chapters X to XVI.

XVIII. A COMPARISON WITH KENYA

Here two factors in racial tension previously noted are absent. There is little white daily-paid labour and the dominating race have a liberal tradition. The English have not lived up to their ideals; all the same, the stabilizing device here is less rigid than in South Africa in a number of ways.

XIX. THE COST OF A STABILIZING DEVICE

It seems that beyond a certain point discussion is futile without a definition of values; only two kinds of discussion are really of value, one religious and philosophical and the other factual, but based on a stated creed. The Belgian for instance has a material object, to achieve which he conceals very carefully a stabilizing device that is exceptionally flexible. The British and American ideals are liberal and democratic and by these standards a stabilizing device is automatically condemned, apart from the cost—which for both races is heavy.

XX. WHAT CAN BE DONE

It is at least better to proceed with knowledge than without it, and what is required is a series of studies of the growth of feeling in certain territories, with an analysis of present feeling. We may thus come to know more of what each group wants and fears.

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